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Search Results (16284 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2024-35935 | 2 Debian, Linux | 2 Debian Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-01-05 | 3.3 Low |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: send: handle path ref underflow in header iterate_inode_ref() Change BUG_ON to proper error handling if building the path buffer fails. The pointers are not printed so we don't accidentally leak kernel addresses. | ||||
| CVE-2024-35875 | 2 Linux, Redhat | 3 Linux Kernel, Enterprise Linux, Rhel Eus | 2026-01-05 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/coco: Require seeding RNG with RDRAND on CoCo systems There are few uses of CoCo that don't rely on working cryptography and hence a working RNG. Unfortunately, the CoCo threat model means that the VM host cannot be trusted and may actively work against guests to extract secrets or manipulate computation. Since a malicious host can modify or observe nearly all inputs to guests, the only remaining source of entropy for CoCo guests is RDRAND. If RDRAND is broken -- due to CPU hardware fault -- the RNG as a whole is meant to gracefully continue on gathering entropy from other sources, but since there aren't other sources on CoCo, this is catastrophic. This is mostly a concern at boot time when initially seeding the RNG, as after that the consequences of a broken RDRAND are much more theoretical. So, try at boot to seed the RNG using 256 bits of RDRAND output. If this fails, panic(). This will also trigger if the system is booted without RDRAND, as RDRAND is essential for a safe CoCo boot. Add this deliberately to be "just a CoCo x86 driver feature" and not part of the RNG itself. Many device drivers and platforms have some desire to contribute something to the RNG, and add_device_randomness() is specifically meant for this purpose. Any driver can call it with seed data of any quality, or even garbage quality, and it can only possibly make the quality of the RNG better or have no effect, but can never make it worse. Rather than trying to build something into the core of the RNG, consider the particular CoCo issue just a CoCo issue, and therefore separate it all out into driver (well, arch/platform) code. [ bp: Massage commit message. ] | ||||
| CVE-2024-35862 | 2 Linux, Redhat | 2 Linux Kernel, Enterprise Linux | 2026-01-05 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix potential UAF in smb2_is_network_name_deleted() Skip sessions that are being teared down (status == SES_EXITING) to avoid UAF. | ||||
| CVE-2024-35861 | 2 Linux, Redhat | 2 Linux Kernel, Enterprise Linux | 2026-01-05 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix potential UAF in cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect() Skip sessions that are being teared down (status == SES_EXITING) to avoid UAF. | ||||
| CVE-2024-35843 | 2 Linux, Redhat | 2 Linux Kernel, Enterprise Linux | 2026-01-05 | 6.8 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu/vt-d: Use device rbtree in iopf reporting path The existing I/O page fault handler currently locates the PCI device by calling pci_get_domain_bus_and_slot(). This function searches the list of all PCI devices until the desired device is found. To improve lookup efficiency, replace it with device_rbtree_find() to search the device within the probed device rbtree. The I/O page fault is initiated by the device, which does not have any synchronization mechanism with the software to ensure that the device stays in the probed device tree. Theoretically, a device could be released by the IOMMU subsystem after device_rbtree_find() and before iopf_get_dev_fault_param(), which would cause a use-after-free problem. Add a mutex to synchronize the I/O page fault reporting path and the IOMMU release device path. This lock doesn't introduce any performance overhead, as the conflict between I/O page fault reporting and device releasing is very rare. | ||||
| CVE-2024-35803 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-01-05 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/efistub: Call mixed mode boot services on the firmware's stack Normally, the EFI stub calls into the EFI boot services using the stack that was live when the stub was entered. According to the UEFI spec, this stack needs to be at least 128k in size - this might seem large but all asynchronous processing and event handling in EFI runs from the same stack and so quite a lot of space may be used in practice. In mixed mode, the situation is a bit different: the bootloader calls the 32-bit EFI stub entry point, which calls the decompressor's 32-bit entry point, where the boot stack is set up, using a fixed allocation of 16k. This stack is still in use when the EFI stub is started in 64-bit mode, and so all calls back into the EFI firmware will be using the decompressor's limited boot stack. Due to the placement of the boot stack right after the boot heap, any stack overruns have gone unnoticed. However, commit 5c4feadb0011983b ("x86/decompressor: Move global symbol references to C code") moved the definition of the boot heap into C code, and now the boot stack is placed right at the base of BSS, where any overruns will corrupt the end of the .data section. While it would be possible to work around this by increasing the size of the boot stack, doing so would affect all x86 systems, and mixed mode systems are a tiny (and shrinking) fraction of the x86 installed base. So instead, record the firmware stack pointer value when entering from the 32-bit firmware, and switch to this stack every time a EFI boot service call is made. | ||||
| CVE-2024-26930 | 2 Linux, Redhat | 3 Linux Kernel, Enterprise Linux, Rhel Eus | 2026-01-05 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: qla2xxx: Fix double free of the ha->vp_map pointer Coverity scan reported potential risk of double free of the pointer ha->vp_map. ha->vp_map was freed in qla2x00_mem_alloc(), and again freed in function qla2x00_mem_free(ha). Assign NULL to vp_map and kfree take care of NULL. | ||||
| CVE-2024-26903 | 2 Linux, Redhat | 2 Linux Kernel, Enterprise Linux | 2026-01-05 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: rfcomm: Fix null-ptr-deref in rfcomm_check_security During our fuzz testing of the connection and disconnection process at the RFCOMM layer, we discovered this bug. By comparing the packets from a normal connection and disconnection process with the testcase that triggered a KASAN report. We analyzed the cause of this bug as follows: 1. In the packets captured during a normal connection, the host sends a `Read Encryption Key Size` type of `HCI_CMD` packet (Command Opcode: 0x1408) to the controller to inquire the length of encryption key.After receiving this packet, the controller immediately replies with a Command Completepacket (Event Code: 0x0e) to return the Encryption Key Size. 2. In our fuzz test case, the timing of the controller's response to this packet was delayed to an unexpected point: after the RFCOMM and L2CAP layers had disconnected but before the HCI layer had disconnected. 3. After receiving the Encryption Key Size Response at the time described in point 2, the host still called the rfcomm_check_security function. However, by this time `struct l2cap_conn *conn = l2cap_pi(sk)->chan->conn;` had already been released, and when the function executed `return hci_conn_security(conn->hcon, d->sec_level, auth_type, d->out);`, specifically when accessing `conn->hcon`, a null-ptr-deref error occurred. To fix this bug, check if `sk->sk_state` is BT_CLOSED before calling rfcomm_recv_frame in rfcomm_process_rx. | ||||
| CVE-2024-26844 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-01-05 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: block: Fix WARNING in _copy_from_iter Syzkaller reports a warning in _copy_from_iter because an iov_iter is supposedly used in the wrong direction. The reason is that syzcaller managed to generate a request with a transfer direction of SG_DXFER_TO_FROM_DEV. This instructs the kernel to copy user buffers into the kernel, read into the copied buffers and then copy the data back to user space. Thus the iovec is used in both directions. Detect this situation in the block layer and construct a new iterator with the correct direction for the copy-in. | ||||
| CVE-2024-26791 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-01-05 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: dev-replace: properly validate device names There's a syzbot report that device name buffers passed to device replace are not properly checked for string termination which could lead to a read out of bounds in getname_kernel(). Add a helper that validates both source and target device name buffers. For devid as the source initialize the buffer to empty string in case something tries to read it later. This was originally analyzed and fixed in a different way by Edward Adam Davis (see links). | ||||
| CVE-2024-26775 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-01-05 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: aoe: avoid potential deadlock at set_capacity Move set_capacity() outside of the section procected by (&d->lock). To avoid possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- [1] lock(&bdev->bd_size_lock); local_irq_disable(); [2] lock(&d->lock); [3] lock(&bdev->bd_size_lock); <Interrupt> [4] lock(&d->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** Where [1](&bdev->bd_size_lock) hold by zram_add()->set_capacity(). [2]lock(&d->lock) hold by aoeblk_gdalloc(). And aoeblk_gdalloc() is trying to acquire [3](&bdev->bd_size_lock) at set_capacity() call. In this situation an attempt to acquire [4]lock(&d->lock) from aoecmd_cfg_rsp() will lead to deadlock. So the simplest solution is breaking lock dependency [2](&d->lock) -> [3](&bdev->bd_size_lock) by moving set_capacity() outside. | ||||
| CVE-2024-26763 | 2 Debian, Linux | 2 Debian Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-01-05 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-crypt: don't modify the data when using authenticated encryption It was said that authenticated encryption could produce invalid tag when the data that is being encrypted is modified [1]. So, fix this problem by copying the data into the clone bio first and then encrypt them inside the clone bio. This may reduce performance, but it is needed to prevent the user from corrupting the device by writing data with O_DIRECT and modifying them at the same time. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240207004723.GA35324@sol.localdomain/T/ | ||||
| CVE-2024-26719 | 2 Linux, Redhat | 2 Linux Kernel, Enterprise Linux | 2026-01-05 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nouveau: offload fence uevents work to workqueue This should break the deadlock between the fctx lock and the irq lock. This offloads the processing off the work from the irq into a workqueue. | ||||
| CVE-2023-7324 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-01-05 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: ses: Fix possible addl_desc_ptr out-of-bounds accesses Sanitize possible addl_desc_ptr out-of-bounds accesses in ses_enclosure_data_process(). | ||||
| CVE-2023-54160 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-01-05 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: firmware: arm_sdei: Fix sleep from invalid context BUG Running a preempt-rt (v6.2-rc3-rt1) based kernel on an Ampere Altra triggers: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:46 in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 128, non_block: 0, pid: 24, name: cpuhp/0 preempt_count: 0, expected: 0 RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 3 locks held by cpuhp/0/24: #0: ffffda30217c70d0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: cpuhp_thread_fun+0x5c/0x248 #1: ffffda30217c7120 (cpuhp_state-up){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: cpuhp_thread_fun+0x5c/0x248 #2: ffffda3021c711f0 (sdei_list_lock){....}-{3:3}, at: sdei_cpuhp_up+0x3c/0x130 irq event stamp: 36 hardirqs last enabled at (35): [<ffffda301e85b7bc>] finish_task_switch+0xb4/0x2b0 hardirqs last disabled at (36): [<ffffda301e812fec>] cpuhp_thread_fun+0x21c/0x248 softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffda301e80b184>] copy_process+0x63c/0x1ac0 softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 CPU: 0 PID: 24 Comm: cpuhp/0 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc3-rt5-[...] Hardware name: WIWYNN Mt.Jade Server [...] Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x114/0x120 show_stack+0x20/0x70 dump_stack_lvl+0x9c/0xd8 dump_stack+0x18/0x34 __might_resched+0x188/0x228 rt_spin_lock+0x70/0x120 sdei_cpuhp_up+0x3c/0x130 cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x250/0xf08 cpuhp_thread_fun+0x120/0x248 smpboot_thread_fn+0x280/0x320 kthread+0x130/0x140 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 sdei_cpuhp_up() is called in the STARTING hotplug section, which runs with interrupts disabled. Use a CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN entry instead to execute the cpuhp cb later, with preemption enabled. SDEI originally got its own cpuhp slot to allow interacting with perf. It got superseded by pNMI and this early slot is not relevant anymore. [1] Some SDEI calls (e.g. SDEI_1_0_FN_SDEI_PE_MASK) take actions on the calling CPU. It is checked that preemption is disabled for them. _ONLINE cpuhp cb are executed in the 'per CPU hotplug thread'. Preemption is enabled in those threads, but their cpumask is limited to 1 CPU. Move 'WARN_ON_ONCE(preemptible())' statements so that SDEI cpuhp cb don't trigger them. Also add a check for the SDEI_1_0_FN_SDEI_PRIVATE_RESET SDEI call which acts on the calling CPU. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/5813b8c5-ae3e-87fd-fccc-94c9cd08816d@arm.com/ | ||||
| CVE-2023-54158 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-01-05 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: don't free qgroup space unless specified Boris noticed in his simple quotas testing that he was getting a leak with Sweet Tea's change to subvol create that stopped doing a transaction commit. This was just a side effect of that change. In the delayed inode code we have an optimization that will free extra reservations if we think we can pack a dir item into an already modified leaf. Previously this wouldn't be triggered in the subvolume create case because we'd commit the transaction, it was still possible but much harder to trigger. It could actually be triggered if we did a mkdir && subvol create with qgroups enabled. This occurs because in btrfs_insert_delayed_dir_index(), which gets called when we're adding the dir item, we do the following: btrfs_block_rsv_release(fs_info, trans->block_rsv, bytes, NULL); if we're able to skip reserving space. The problem here is that trans->block_rsv points at the temporary block rsv for the subvolume create, which has qgroup reservations in the block rsv. This is a problem because btrfs_block_rsv_release() will do the following: if (block_rsv->qgroup_rsv_reserved >= block_rsv->qgroup_rsv_size) { qgroup_to_release = block_rsv->qgroup_rsv_reserved - block_rsv->qgroup_rsv_size; block_rsv->qgroup_rsv_reserved = block_rsv->qgroup_rsv_size; } The temporary block rsv just has ->qgroup_rsv_reserved set, ->qgroup_rsv_size == 0. The optimization in btrfs_insert_delayed_dir_index() sets ->qgroup_rsv_reserved = 0. Then later on when we call btrfs_subvolume_release_metadata() which has btrfs_block_rsv_release(fs_info, rsv, (u64)-1, &qgroup_to_release); btrfs_qgroup_convert_reserved_meta(root, qgroup_to_release); qgroup_to_release is set to 0, and we do not convert the reserved metadata space. The problem here is that the block rsv code has been unconditionally messing with ->qgroup_rsv_reserved, because the main place this is used is delalloc, and any time we call btrfs_block_rsv_release() we do it with qgroup_to_release set, and thus do the proper accounting. The subvolume code is the only other code that uses the qgroup reservation stuff, but it's intermingled with the above optimization, and thus was getting its reservation freed out from underneath it and thus leaking the reserved space. The solution is to simply not mess with the qgroup reservations if we don't have qgroup_to_release set. This works with the existing code as anything that messes with the delalloc reservations always have qgroup_to_release set. This fixes the leak that Boris was observing. | ||||
| CVE-2023-54151 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-01-05 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: Fix system crash due to lack of free space in LFS When f2fs tries to checkpoint during foreground gc in LFS mode, system crash occurs due to lack of free space if the amount of dirty node and dentry pages generated by data migration exceeds free space. The reproduction sequence is as follows. - 20GiB capacity block device (null_blk) - format and mount with LFS mode - create a file and write 20,000MiB - 4k random write on full range of the file RIP: 0010:new_curseg+0x48a/0x510 [f2fs] Code: 55 e7 f5 89 c0 48 0f af c3 48 8b 5d c0 48 c1 e8 20 83 c0 01 89 43 6c 48 83 c4 28 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc <0f> 0b f0 41 80 4f 48 04 45 85 f6 0f 84 ba fd ff ff e9 ef fe ff ff RSP: 0018:ffff977bc397b218 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 00000000000027b9 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00000000000027c0 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000000027b9 RDI: ffff8c25ab4e74f8 RBP: ffff977bc397b268 R08: 00000000000027b9 R09: ffff8c29e4a34b40 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff977bc397b0d8 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff8c25b4dd81a0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8c2f667f9000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8c344ec80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000c00055d000 CR3: 0000000e30810003 CR4: 00000000003706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> allocate_segment_by_default+0x9c/0x110 [f2fs] f2fs_allocate_data_block+0x243/0xa30 [f2fs] ? __mod_lruvec_page_state+0xa0/0x150 do_write_page+0x80/0x160 [f2fs] f2fs_do_write_node_page+0x32/0x50 [f2fs] __write_node_page+0x339/0x730 [f2fs] f2fs_sync_node_pages+0x5a6/0x780 [f2fs] block_operations+0x257/0x340 [f2fs] f2fs_write_checkpoint+0x102/0x1050 [f2fs] f2fs_gc+0x27c/0x630 [f2fs] ? folio_mark_dirty+0x36/0x70 f2fs_balance_fs+0x16f/0x180 [f2fs] This patch adds checking whether free sections are enough before checkpoint during gc. [Jaegeuk Kim: code clean-up] | ||||
| CVE-2023-54150 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-01-05 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd: Fix an out of bounds error in BIOS parser The array is hardcoded to 8 in atomfirmware.h, but firmware provides a bigger one sometimes. Deferencing the larger array causes an out of bounds error. commit 4fc1ba4aa589 ("drm/amd/display: fix array index out of bound error in bios parser") fixed some of this, but there are two other cases not covered by it. Fix those as well. | ||||
| CVE-2023-54145 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-01-05 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: drop unnecessary user-triggerable WARN_ONCE in verifierl log It's trivial for user to trigger "verifier log line truncated" warning, as verifier has a fixed-sized buffer of 1024 bytes (as of now), and there are at least two pieces of user-provided information that can be output through this buffer, and both can be arbitrarily sized by user: - BTF names; - BTF.ext source code lines strings. Verifier log buffer should be properly sized for typical verifier state output. But it's sort-of expected that this buffer won't be long enough in some circumstances. So let's drop the check. In any case code will work correctly, at worst truncating a part of a single line output. | ||||
| CVE-2023-54134 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-01-05 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: autofs: fix memory leak of waitqueues in autofs_catatonic_mode Syzkaller reports a memory leak: BUG: memory leak unreferenced object 0xffff88810b279e00 (size 96): comm "syz-executor399", pid 3631, jiffies 4294964921 (age 23.870s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 9e 27 0b 81 88 ff ff ..........'..... 08 9e 27 0b 81 88 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ..'............. backtrace: [<ffffffff814cfc90>] kmalloc_trace+0x20/0x90 mm/slab_common.c:1046 [<ffffffff81bb75ca>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:576 [inline] [<ffffffff81bb75ca>] autofs_wait+0x3fa/0x9a0 fs/autofs/waitq.c:378 [<ffffffff81bb88a7>] autofs_do_expire_multi+0xa7/0x3e0 fs/autofs/expire.c:593 [<ffffffff81bb8c33>] autofs_expire_multi+0x53/0x80 fs/autofs/expire.c:619 [<ffffffff81bb6972>] autofs_root_ioctl_unlocked+0x322/0x3b0 fs/autofs/root.c:897 [<ffffffff81bb6a95>] autofs_root_ioctl+0x25/0x30 fs/autofs/root.c:910 [<ffffffff81602a9c>] vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] [<ffffffff81602a9c>] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:870 [inline] [<ffffffff81602a9c>] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:856 [inline] [<ffffffff81602a9c>] __x64_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x140 fs/ioctl.c:856 [<ffffffff84608225>] do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] [<ffffffff84608225>] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 [<ffffffff84800087>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd autofs_wait_queue structs should be freed if their wait_ctr becomes zero. Otherwise they will be lost. In this case an AUTOFS_IOC_EXPIRE_MULTI ioctl is done, then a new waitqueue struct is allocated in autofs_wait(), its initial wait_ctr equals 2. After that wait_event_killable() is interrupted (it returns -ERESTARTSYS), so that 'wq->name.name == NULL' condition may be not satisfied. Actually, this condition can be satisfied when autofs_wait_release() or autofs_catatonic_mode() is called and, what is also important, wait_ctr is decremented in those places. Upon the exit of autofs_wait(), wait_ctr is decremented to 1. Then the unmounting process begins: kill_sb calls autofs_catatonic_mode(), which should have freed the waitqueues, but it only decrements its usage counter to zero which is not a correct behaviour. edit:imk This description is of course not correct. The umount performed as a result of an expire is a umount of a mount that has been automounted, it's not the autofs mount itself. They happen independently, usually after everything mounted within the autofs file system has been expired away. If everything hasn't been expired away the automount daemon can still exit leaving mounts in place. But expires done in both cases will result in a notification that calls autofs_wait_release() with a result status. The problem case is the summary execution of of the automount daemon. In this case any waiting processes won't be woken up until either they are terminated or the mount is umounted. end edit: imk So in catatonic mode we should free waitqueues which counter becomes zero. edit: imk Initially I was concerned that the calling of autofs_wait_release() and autofs_catatonic_mode() was not mutually exclusive but that can't be the case (obviously) because the queue entry (or entries) is removed from the list when either of these two functions are called. Consequently the wait entry will be freed by only one of these functions or by the woken process in autofs_wait() depending on the order of the calls. end edit: imk | ||||