| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/hyperv: Disable IBT when hypercall page lacks ENDBR instruction
On hardware that supports Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT), Hyper-V VMs
with ConfigVersion 9.3 or later support IBT in the guest. However,
current versions of Hyper-V have a bug in that there's not an ENDBR64
instruction at the beginning of the hypercall page. Since hypercalls are
made with an indirect call to the hypercall page, all hypercall attempts
fail with an exception and Linux panics.
A Hyper-V fix is in progress to add ENDBR64. But guard against the Linux
panic by clearing X86_FEATURE_IBT if the hypercall page doesn't start
with ENDBR. The VM will boot and run without IBT.
If future Linux 32-bit kernels were to support IBT, additional hypercall
page hackery would be needed to make IBT work for such kernels in a
Hyper-V VM. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme-fabrics: use reserved tag for reg read/write command
In some scenarios, if too many commands are issued by nvme command in
the same time by user tasks, this may exhaust all tags of admin_q. If
a reset (nvme reset or IO timeout) occurs before these commands finish,
reconnect routine may fail to update nvme regs due to insufficient tags,
which will cause kernel hang forever. In order to workaround this issue,
maybe we can let reg_read32()/reg_read64()/reg_write32() use reserved
tags. This maybe safe for nvmf:
1. For the disable ctrl path, we will not issue connect command
2. For the enable ctrl / fw activate path, since connect and reg_xx()
are called serially.
So the reserved tags may still be enough while reg_xx() use reserved tags. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSv4: Fix memory leak in nfs4_set_security_label
We leak nfs_fattr and nfs4_label every time we set a security xattr. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: scrub: handle RST lookup error correctly
[BUG]
When running btrfs/060 with forced RST feature, it would crash the
following ASSERT() inside scrub_read_endio():
ASSERT(sector_nr < stripe->nr_sectors);
Before that, we would have tree dump from
btrfs_get_raid_extent_offset(), as we failed to find the RST entry for
the range.
[CAUSE]
Inside scrub_submit_extent_sector_read() every time we allocated a new
bbio we immediately called btrfs_map_block() to make sure there was some
RST range covering the scrub target.
But if btrfs_map_block() fails, we immediately call endio for the bbio,
while the bbio is newly allocated, it's completely empty.
Then inside scrub_read_endio(), we go through the bvecs to find
the sector number (as bi_sector is no longer reliable if the bio is
submitted to lower layers).
And since the bio is empty, such bvecs iteration would not find any
sector matching the sector, and return sector_nr == stripe->nr_sectors,
triggering the ASSERT().
[FIX]
Instead of calling btrfs_map_block() after allocating a new bbio, call
btrfs_map_block() first.
Since our only objective of calling btrfs_map_block() is only to update
stripe_len, there is really no need to do that after btrfs_alloc_bio().
This new timing would avoid the problem of handling empty bbio
completely, and in fact fixes a possible race window for the old code,
where if the submission thread is the only owner of the pending_io, the
scrub would never finish (since we didn't decrease the pending_io
counter).
Although the root cause of RST lookup failure still needs to be
addressed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
jfs: don't walk off the end of ealist
Add a check before visiting the members of ea to
make sure each ea stays within the ealist. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix crash on racing fsync and size-extending write into prealloc
We have been seeing crashes on duplicate keys in
btrfs_set_item_key_safe():
BTRFS critical (device vdb): slot 4 key (450 108 8192) new key (450 108 8192)
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2620!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 3139 Comm: xfs_io Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.9.0 #6
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:btrfs_set_item_key_safe+0x11f/0x290 [btrfs]
With the following stack trace:
#0 btrfs_set_item_key_safe (fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2620:4)
#1 btrfs_drop_extents (fs/btrfs/file.c:411:4)
#2 log_one_extent (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:4732:9)
#3 btrfs_log_changed_extents (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:4955:9)
#4 btrfs_log_inode (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6626:9)
#5 btrfs_log_inode_parent (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7070:8)
#6 btrfs_log_dentry_safe (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7171:8)
#7 btrfs_sync_file (fs/btrfs/file.c:1933:8)
#8 vfs_fsync_range (fs/sync.c:188:9)
#9 vfs_fsync (fs/sync.c:202:9)
#10 do_fsync (fs/sync.c:212:9)
#11 __do_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:225:9)
#12 __se_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:223:1)
#13 __x64_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:223:1)
#14 do_syscall_x64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52:14)
#15 do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:83:7)
#16 entry_SYSCALL_64+0xaf/0x14c (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)
So we're logging a changed extent from fsync, which is splitting an
extent in the log tree. But this split part already exists in the tree,
triggering the BUG().
This is the state of the log tree at the time of the crash, dumped with
drgn (https://github.com/osandov/drgn/blob/main/contrib/btrfs_tree.py)
to get more details than btrfs_print_leaf() gives us:
>>> print_extent_buffer(prog.crashed_thread().stack_trace()[0]["eb"])
leaf 33439744 level 0 items 72 generation 9 owner 18446744073709551610
leaf 33439744 flags 0x100000000000000
fs uuid e5bd3946-400c-4223-8923-190ef1f18677
chunk uuid d58cb17e-6d02-494a-829a-18b7d8a399da
item 0 key (450 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 16123 itemsize 160
generation 7 transid 9 size 8192 nbytes 8473563889606862198
block group 0 mode 100600 links 1 uid 0 gid 0 rdev 0
sequence 204 flags 0x10(PREALLOC)
atime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)
ctime 1716417704.983333333 (2024-05-22 15:41:44)
mtime 1716417704.983333333 (2024-05-22 15:41:44)
otime 17592186044416.000000000 (559444-03-08 01:40:16)
item 1 key (450 INODE_REF 256) itemoff 16110 itemsize 13
index 195 namelen 3 name: 193
item 2 key (450 XATTR_ITEM 1640047104) itemoff 16073 itemsize 37
location key (0 UNKNOWN.0 0) type XATTR
transid 7 data_len 1 name_len 6
name: user.a
data a
item 3 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 0) itemoff 16020 itemsize 53
generation 9 type 1 (regular)
extent data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
extent data offset 0 nr 4096 ram 12288
extent compression 0 (none)
item 4 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 4096) itemoff 15967 itemsize 53
generation 9 type 2 (prealloc)
prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
prealloc data offset 4096 nr 8192
item 5 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 8192) itemoff 15914 itemsize 53
generation 9 type 2 (prealloc)
prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
prealloc data offset 8192 nr 4096
...
So the real problem happened earlier: notice that items 4 (4k-12k) and 5
(8k-12k) overlap. Both are prealloc extents. Item 4 straddles i_size and
item 5 starts at i_size.
Here is the state of
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/9p: only translate RWX permissions for plain 9P2000
Garbage in plain 9P2000's perm bits is allowed through, which causes it
to be able to set (among others) the suid bit. This was presumably not
the intent since the unix extended bits are handled explicitly and
conditionally on .u. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hv_netvsc: Don't free decrypted memory
In CoCo VMs it is possible for the untrusted host to cause
set_memory_encrypted() or set_memory_decrypted() to fail such that an
error is returned and the resulting memory is shared. Callers need to
take care to handle these errors to avoid returning decrypted (shared)
memory to the page allocator, which could lead to functional or security
issues.
The netvsc driver could free decrypted/shared pages if
set_memory_decrypted() fails. Check the decrypted field in the gpadl
to decide whether to free the memory. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dyndbg: fix old BUG_ON in >control parser
Fix a BUG_ON from 2009. Even if it looks "unreachable" (I didn't
really look), lets make sure by removing it, doing pr_err and return
-EINVAL instead. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: handle chunk tree lookup error in btrfs_relocate_sys_chunks()
The unhandled case in btrfs_relocate_sys_chunks() loop is a corruption,
as it could be caused only by two impossible conditions:
- at first the search key is set up to look for a chunk tree item, with
offset -1, this is an inexact search and the key->offset will contain
the correct offset upon a successful search, a valid chunk tree item
cannot have an offset -1
- after first successful search, the found_key corresponds to a chunk
item, the offset is decremented by 1 before the next loop, it's
impossible to find a chunk item there due to alignment and size
constraints |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: send: handle path ref underflow in header iterate_inode_ref()
Change BUG_ON to proper error handling if building the path buffer
fails. The pointers are not printed so we don't accidentally leak kernel
addresses. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/coco: Require seeding RNG with RDRAND on CoCo systems
There are few uses of CoCo that don't rely on working cryptography and
hence a working RNG. Unfortunately, the CoCo threat model means that the
VM host cannot be trusted and may actively work against guests to
extract secrets or manipulate computation. Since a malicious host can
modify or observe nearly all inputs to guests, the only remaining source
of entropy for CoCo guests is RDRAND.
If RDRAND is broken -- due to CPU hardware fault -- the RNG as a whole
is meant to gracefully continue on gathering entropy from other sources,
but since there aren't other sources on CoCo, this is catastrophic.
This is mostly a concern at boot time when initially seeding the RNG, as
after that the consequences of a broken RDRAND are much more
theoretical.
So, try at boot to seed the RNG using 256 bits of RDRAND output. If this
fails, panic(). This will also trigger if the system is booted without
RDRAND, as RDRAND is essential for a safe CoCo boot.
Add this deliberately to be "just a CoCo x86 driver feature" and not
part of the RNG itself. Many device drivers and platforms have some
desire to contribute something to the RNG, and add_device_randomness()
is specifically meant for this purpose.
Any driver can call it with seed data of any quality, or even garbage
quality, and it can only possibly make the quality of the RNG better or
have no effect, but can never make it worse.
Rather than trying to build something into the core of the RNG, consider
the particular CoCo issue just a CoCo issue, and therefore separate it
all out into driver (well, arch/platform) code.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix potential UAF in cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect()
Skip sessions that are being teared down (status == SES_EXITING) to
avoid UAF. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/vt-d: Use device rbtree in iopf reporting path
The existing I/O page fault handler currently locates the PCI device by
calling pci_get_domain_bus_and_slot(). This function searches the list
of all PCI devices until the desired device is found. To improve lookup
efficiency, replace it with device_rbtree_find() to search the device
within the probed device rbtree.
The I/O page fault is initiated by the device, which does not have any
synchronization mechanism with the software to ensure that the device
stays in the probed device tree. Theoretically, a device could be released
by the IOMMU subsystem after device_rbtree_find() and before
iopf_get_dev_fault_param(), which would cause a use-after-free problem.
Add a mutex to synchronize the I/O page fault reporting path and the IOMMU
release device path. This lock doesn't introduce any performance overhead,
as the conflict between I/O page fault reporting and device releasing is
very rare. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/efistub: Call mixed mode boot services on the firmware's stack
Normally, the EFI stub calls into the EFI boot services using the stack
that was live when the stub was entered. According to the UEFI spec,
this stack needs to be at least 128k in size - this might seem large but
all asynchronous processing and event handling in EFI runs from the same
stack and so quite a lot of space may be used in practice.
In mixed mode, the situation is a bit different: the bootloader calls
the 32-bit EFI stub entry point, which calls the decompressor's 32-bit
entry point, where the boot stack is set up, using a fixed allocation
of 16k. This stack is still in use when the EFI stub is started in
64-bit mode, and so all calls back into the EFI firmware will be using
the decompressor's limited boot stack.
Due to the placement of the boot stack right after the boot heap, any
stack overruns have gone unnoticed. However, commit
5c4feadb0011983b ("x86/decompressor: Move global symbol references to C code")
moved the definition of the boot heap into C code, and now the boot
stack is placed right at the base of BSS, where any overruns will
corrupt the end of the .data section.
While it would be possible to work around this by increasing the size of
the boot stack, doing so would affect all x86 systems, and mixed mode
systems are a tiny (and shrinking) fraction of the x86 installed base.
So instead, record the firmware stack pointer value when entering from
the 32-bit firmware, and switch to this stack every time a EFI boot
service call is made. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Fix double free of the ha->vp_map pointer
Coverity scan reported potential risk of double free of the pointer
ha->vp_map. ha->vp_map was freed in qla2x00_mem_alloc(), and again freed
in function qla2x00_mem_free(ha).
Assign NULL to vp_map and kfree take care of NULL. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
block: Fix WARNING in _copy_from_iter
Syzkaller reports a warning in _copy_from_iter because an
iov_iter is supposedly used in the wrong direction. The reason
is that syzcaller managed to generate a request with
a transfer direction of SG_DXFER_TO_FROM_DEV. This instructs
the kernel to copy user buffers into the kernel, read into
the copied buffers and then copy the data back to user space.
Thus the iovec is used in both directions.
Detect this situation in the block layer and construct a new
iterator with the correct direction for the copy-in. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: dev-replace: properly validate device names
There's a syzbot report that device name buffers passed to device
replace are not properly checked for string termination which could lead
to a read out of bounds in getname_kernel().
Add a helper that validates both source and target device name buffers.
For devid as the source initialize the buffer to empty string in case
something tries to read it later.
This was originally analyzed and fixed in a different way by Edward Adam
Davis (see links). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
aoe: avoid potential deadlock at set_capacity
Move set_capacity() outside of the section procected by (&d->lock).
To avoid possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
[1] lock(&bdev->bd_size_lock);
local_irq_disable();
[2] lock(&d->lock);
[3] lock(&bdev->bd_size_lock);
<Interrupt>
[4] lock(&d->lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
Where [1](&bdev->bd_size_lock) hold by zram_add()->set_capacity().
[2]lock(&d->lock) hold by aoeblk_gdalloc(). And aoeblk_gdalloc()
is trying to acquire [3](&bdev->bd_size_lock) at set_capacity() call.
In this situation an attempt to acquire [4]lock(&d->lock) from
aoecmd_cfg_rsp() will lead to deadlock.
So the simplest solution is breaking lock dependency
[2](&d->lock) -> [3](&bdev->bd_size_lock) by moving set_capacity()
outside. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm-crypt: don't modify the data when using authenticated encryption
It was said that authenticated encryption could produce invalid tag when
the data that is being encrypted is modified [1]. So, fix this problem by
copying the data into the clone bio first and then encrypt them inside the
clone bio.
This may reduce performance, but it is needed to prevent the user from
corrupting the device by writing data with O_DIRECT and modifying them at
the same time.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240207004723.GA35324@sol.localdomain/T/ |
