| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/rsrc: don't lock while !TASK_RUNNING
There is a report of io_rsrc_ref_quiesce() locking a mutex while not
TASK_RUNNING, which is due to forgetting restoring the state back after
io_run_task_work_sig() and attempts to break out of the waiting loop.
do not call blocking ops when !TASK_RUNNING; state=1 set at
[<ffffffff815d2494>] prepare_to_wait+0xa4/0x380
kernel/sched/wait.c:237
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 397056 at kernel/sched/core.c:10099
__might_sleep+0x114/0x160 kernel/sched/core.c:10099
RIP: 0010:__might_sleep+0x114/0x160 kernel/sched/core.c:10099
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0xb4/0x940 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752
io_rsrc_ref_quiesce+0x590/0x940 io_uring/rsrc.c:253
io_sqe_buffers_unregister+0xa2/0x340 io_uring/rsrc.c:799
__io_uring_register io_uring/register.c:424 [inline]
__do_sys_io_uring_register+0x5b9/0x2400 io_uring/register.c:613
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xd8/0x270 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipmr,ip6mr: acquire RTNL before calling ip[6]mr_free_table() on failure path
ip[6]mr_free_table() can only be called under RTNL lock.
RTNL: assertion failed at net/core/dev.c (10367)
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 5890 at net/core/dev.c:10367 unregister_netdevice_many+0x1246/0x1850 net/core/dev.c:10367
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 5890 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.16.0-syzkaller-11627-g422ee58dc0ef #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:unregister_netdevice_many+0x1246/0x1850 net/core/dev.c:10367
Code: 0f 85 9b ee ff ff e8 69 07 4b fa ba 7f 28 00 00 48 c7 c6 00 90 ae 8a 48 c7 c7 40 90 ae 8a c6 05 6d b1 51 06 01 e8 8c 90 d8 01 <0f> 0b e9 70 ee ff ff e8 3e 07 4b fa 4c 89 e7 e8 86 2a 59 fa e9 ee
RSP: 0018:ffffc900046ff6e0 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff888050f51d00 RSI: ffffffff815fa008 RDI: fffff520008dfece
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffffffff815f3d6e R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000fffffff4
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffffc900046ff750 R15: ffff88807b7dc000
FS: 00007f4ab736e700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fee0b4f8990 CR3: 000000001e7d2000 CR4: 00000000003506e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
mroute_clean_tables+0x244/0xb40 net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:1509
ip6mr_free_table net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:389 [inline]
ip6mr_rules_init net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:246 [inline]
ip6mr_net_init net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:1306 [inline]
ip6mr_net_init+0x3f0/0x4e0 net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:1298
ops_init+0xaf/0x470 net/core/net_namespace.c:140
setup_net+0x54f/0xbb0 net/core/net_namespace.c:331
copy_net_ns+0x318/0x760 net/core/net_namespace.c:475
create_new_namespaces+0x3f6/0xb20 kernel/nsproxy.c:110
copy_namespaces+0x391/0x450 kernel/nsproxy.c:178
copy_process+0x2e0c/0x7300 kernel/fork.c:2167
kernel_clone+0xe7/0xab0 kernel/fork.c:2555
__do_sys_clone+0xc8/0x110 kernel/fork.c:2672
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7f4ab89f9059
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0x7f4ab89f902f.
RSP: 002b:00007f4ab736e118 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000038
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f4ab8b0bf60 RCX: 00007f4ab89f9059
RDX: 0000000020000280 RSI: 0000000020000270 RDI: 0000000040200000
RBP: 00007f4ab8a5308d R08: 0000000020000300 R09: 0000000020000300
R10: 00000000200002c0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007ffc3977cc1f R14: 00007f4ab736e300 R15: 0000000000022000
</TASK> |
| OpenSynergy BlueSDK (aka Blue SDK) through 6.x has a Use-After-Free. The specific flaw exists within the BlueSDK Bluetooth stack. The issue results from the lack of validating the existence of an object before performing operations on the object (aka use after free). An attacker can leverage this to achieve remote code execution in the context of a user account under which the Bluetooth process runs. |
| In OpenBSD 7.5 before errata 008 and OpenBSD 7.4 before errata 021,
avoid possible mbuf double free in NFS client and server implementation, do not use uninitialized variable in error handling of NFS server. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/migrate_device: don't add folio to be freed to LRU in migrate_device_finalize()
If migration succeeded, we called
folio_migrate_flags()->mem_cgroup_migrate() to migrate the memcg from the
old to the new folio. This will set memcg_data of the old folio to 0.
Similarly, if migration failed, memcg_data of the dst folio is left unset.
If we call folio_putback_lru() on such folios (memcg_data == 0), we will
add the folio to be freed to the LRU, making memcg code unhappy. Running
the hmm selftests:
# ./hmm-tests
...
# RUN hmm.hmm_device_private.migrate ...
[ 102.078007][T14893] page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x7ff27d200 pfn:0x13cc00
[ 102.079974][T14893] anon flags: 0x17ff00000020018(uptodate|dirty|swapbacked|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
[ 102.082037][T14893] raw: 017ff00000020018 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff8881353896c9
[ 102.083687][T14893] raw: 00000007ff27d200 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 102.085331][T14893] page dumped because: VM_WARN_ON_ONCE_FOLIO(!memcg && !mem_cgroup_disabled())
[ 102.087230][T14893] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 102.088279][T14893] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 14893 at ./include/linux/memcontrol.h:726 folio_lruvec_lock_irqsave+0x10e/0x170
[ 102.090478][T14893] Modules linked in:
[ 102.091244][T14893] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 14893 Comm: hmm-tests Not tainted 6.13.0-09623-g6c216bc522fd #151
[ 102.093089][T14893] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
[ 102.094848][T14893] RIP: 0010:folio_lruvec_lock_irqsave+0x10e/0x170
[ 102.096104][T14893] Code: ...
[ 102.099908][T14893] RSP: 0018:ffffc900236c37b0 EFLAGS: 00010293
[ 102.101152][T14893] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffea0004f30000 RCX: ffffffff8183f426
[ 102.102684][T14893] RDX: ffff8881063cb880 RSI: ffffffff81b8117f RDI: ffff8881063cb880
[ 102.104227][T14893] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 102.105757][T14893] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffffc900236c37d8
[ 102.107296][T14893] R13: ffff888277a2bcb0 R14: 000000000000001f R15: 0000000000000000
[ 102.108830][T14893] FS: 00007ff27dbdd740(0000) GS:ffff888277a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 102.110643][T14893] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 102.111924][T14893] CR2: 00007ff27d400000 CR3: 000000010866e000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
[ 102.113478][T14893] PKRU: 55555554
[ 102.114172][T14893] Call Trace:
[ 102.114805][T14893] <TASK>
[ 102.115397][T14893] ? folio_lruvec_lock_irqsave+0x10e/0x170
[ 102.116547][T14893] ? __warn.cold+0x110/0x210
[ 102.117461][T14893] ? folio_lruvec_lock_irqsave+0x10e/0x170
[ 102.118667][T14893] ? report_bug+0x1b9/0x320
[ 102.119571][T14893] ? handle_bug+0x54/0x90
[ 102.120494][T14893] ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x50
[ 102.121433][T14893] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
[ 102.122435][T14893] ? __wake_up_klogd.part.0+0x76/0xd0
[ 102.123506][T14893] ? dump_page+0x4f/0x60
[ 102.124352][T14893] ? folio_lruvec_lock_irqsave+0x10e/0x170
[ 102.125500][T14893] folio_batch_move_lru+0xd4/0x200
[ 102.126577][T14893] ? __pfx_lru_add+0x10/0x10
[ 102.127505][T14893] __folio_batch_add_and_move+0x391/0x720
[ 102.128633][T14893] ? __pfx_lru_add+0x10/0x10
[ 102.129550][T14893] folio_putback_lru+0x16/0x80
[ 102.130564][T14893] migrate_device_finalize+0x9b/0x530
[ 102.131640][T14893] dmirror_migrate_to_device.constprop.0+0x7c5/0xad0
[ 102.133047][T14893] dmirror_fops_unlocked_ioctl+0x89b/0xc80
Likely, nothing else goes wrong: putting the last folio reference will
remove the folio from the LRU again. So besides memcg complaining, adding
the folio to be freed to the LRU is just an unnecessary step.
The new flow resembles what we have in migrate_folio_move(): add the dst
to the lru, rem
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: topology: Fix references to freed memory
Most users after parsing a topology file, release memory used by it, so
having pointer references directly into topology file contents is wrong.
Use devm_kmemdup(), to allocate memory as needed. |
| Use after free in some Zoom Workplace Apps and SDKs may allow an authenticated user to conduct a denial of service via network access. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Fix slab-use-after-free on hdcp_work
[Why]
A slab-use-after-free is reported when HDCP is destroyed but the
property_validate_dwork queue is still running.
[How]
Cancel the delayed work when destroying workqueue.
(cherry picked from commit 725a04ba5a95e89c89633d4322430cfbca7ce128) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Handle dml allocation failure to avoid crash
[Why]
In the case where a dml allocation fails for any reason, the
current state's dml contexts would no longer be valid. Then
subsequent calls dc_state_copy_internal would shallow copy
invalid memory and if the new state was released, a double
free would occur.
[How]
Reset dml pointers in new_state to NULL and avoid invalid
pointer
(cherry picked from commit bcafdc61529a48f6f06355d78eb41b3aeda5296c) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hv_sock: Initializing vsk->trans to NULL to prevent a dangling pointer
When hvs is released, there is a possibility that vsk->trans may not
be initialized to NULL, which could lead to a dangling pointer.
This issue is resolved by initializing vsk->trans to NULL. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: Fix missing locking causing hanging calls
If a call gets aborted (e.g. because kafs saw a signal) between it being
queued for connection and the I/O thread picking up the call, the abort
will be prioritised over the connection and it will be removed from
local->new_client_calls by rxrpc_disconnect_client_call() without a lock
being held. This may cause other calls on the list to disappear if a race
occurs.
Fix this by taking the client_call_lock when removing a call from whatever
list its ->wait_link happens to be on. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: do not leave a dangling sk pointer in __smc_create()
Thanks to commit 4bbd360a5084 ("socket: Print pf->create() when
it does not clear sock->sk on failure."), syzbot found an issue with AF_SMC:
smc_create must clear sock->sk on failure, family: 43, type: 1, protocol: 0
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5827 at net/socket.c:1565 __sock_create+0x96f/0xa30 net/socket.c:1563
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5827 Comm: syz-executor259 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-next-20241106-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
RIP: 0010:__sock_create+0x96f/0xa30 net/socket.c:1563
Code: 03 00 74 08 4c 89 e7 e8 4f 3b 85 f8 49 8b 34 24 48 c7 c7 40 89 0c 8d 8b 54 24 04 8b 4c 24 0c 44 8b 44 24 08 e8 32 78 db f7 90 <0f> 0b 90 90 e9 d3 fd ff ff 89 e9 80 e1 07 fe c1 38 c1 0f 8c ee f7
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003e4fda0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 099c6f938c7f4700 RBX: 1ffffffff1a595fd RCX: ffff888034823c00
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 00000000ffffffe9 R08: ffffffff81567052 R09: 1ffff920007c9f50
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff520007c9f51 R12: ffffffff8d2cafe8
R13: 1ffffffff1a595fe R14: ffffffff9a789c40 R15: ffff8880764298c0
FS: 000055557b518380(0000) GS:ffff8880b8600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fa62ff43225 CR3: 0000000031628000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
sock_create net/socket.c:1616 [inline]
__sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1653 [inline]
__sys_socket+0x150/0x3c0 net/socket.c:1700
__do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1714 [inline]
__se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1712 [inline]
For reference, see commit 2d859aff775d ("Merge branch
'do-not-leave-dangling-sk-pointers-in-pf-create-functions'") |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
idpf: avoid vport access in idpf_get_link_ksettings
When the device control plane is removed or the platform
running device control plane is rebooted, a reset is detected
on the driver. On driver reset, it releases the resources and
waits for the reset to complete. If the reset fails, it takes
the error path and releases the vport lock. At this time if the
monitoring tools tries to access link settings, it call traces
for accessing released vport pointer.
To avoid it, move link_speed_mbps to netdev_priv structure
which removes the dependency on vport pointer and the vport lock
in idpf_get_link_ksettings. Also use netif_carrier_ok()
to check the link status and adjust the offsetof to use link_up
instead of link_speed_mbps. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: musb: sunxi: Fix accessing an released usb phy
Commit 6ed05c68cbca ("usb: musb: sunxi: Explicitly release USB PHY on
exit") will cause that usb phy @glue->xceiv is accessed after released.
1) register platform driver @sunxi_musb_driver
// get the usb phy @glue->xceiv
sunxi_musb_probe() -> devm_usb_get_phy().
2) register and unregister platform driver @musb_driver
musb_probe() -> sunxi_musb_init()
use the phy here
//the phy is released here
musb_remove() -> sunxi_musb_exit() -> devm_usb_put_phy()
3) register @musb_driver again
musb_probe() -> sunxi_musb_init()
use the phy here but the phy has been released at 2).
...
Fixed by reverting the commit, namely, removing devm_usb_put_phy()
from sunxi_musb_exit(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: clear wdev->cqm_config pointer on free
When we free wdev->cqm_config when unregistering, we also
need to clear out the pointer since the same wdev/netdev
may get re-registered in another network namespace, then
destroyed later, running this code again, which results in
a double-free. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet-auth: assign dh_key to NULL after kfree_sensitive
ctrl->dh_key might be used across multiple calls to nvmet_setup_dhgroup()
for the same controller. So it's better to nullify it after release on
error path in order to avoid double free later in nvmet_destroy_auth().
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Svace. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/vc4: Stop the active perfmon before being destroyed
Upon closing the file descriptor, the active performance monitor is not
stopped. Although all perfmons are destroyed in `vc4_perfmon_close_file()`,
the active performance monitor's pointer (`vc4->active_perfmon`) is still
retained.
If we open a new file descriptor and submit a few jobs with performance
monitors, the driver will attempt to stop the active performance monitor
using the stale pointer in `vc4->active_perfmon`. However, this pointer
is no longer valid because the previous process has already terminated,
and all performance monitors associated with it have been destroyed and
freed.
To fix this, when the active performance monitor belongs to a given
process, explicitly stop it before destroying and freeing it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: explicitly clear the sk pointer, when pf->create fails
We have recently noticed the exact same KASAN splat as in commit
6cd4a78d962b ("net: do not leave a dangling sk pointer, when socket
creation fails"). The problem is that commit did not fully address the
problem, as some pf->create implementations do not use sk_common_release
in their error paths.
For example, we can use the same reproducer as in the above commit, but
changing ping to arping. arping uses AF_PACKET socket and if packet_create
fails, it will just sk_free the allocated sk object.
While we could chase all the pf->create implementations and make sure they
NULL the freed sk object on error from the socket, we can't guarantee
future protocols will not make the same mistake.
So it is easier to just explicitly NULL the sk pointer upon return from
pf->create in __sock_create. We do know that pf->create always releases the
allocated sk object on error, so if the pointer is not NULL, it is
definitely dangling. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched/core: Disable page allocation in task_tick_mm_cid()
With KASAN and PREEMPT_RT enabled, calling task_work_add() in
task_tick_mm_cid() may cause the following splat.
[ 63.696416] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:48
[ 63.696416] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 610, name: modprobe
[ 63.696416] preempt_count: 10001, expected: 0
[ 63.696416] RCU nest depth: 1, expected: 1
This problem is caused by the following call trace.
sched_tick() [ acquire rq->__lock ]
-> task_tick_mm_cid()
-> task_work_add()
-> __kasan_record_aux_stack()
-> kasan_save_stack()
-> stack_depot_save_flags()
-> alloc_pages_mpol_noprof()
-> __alloc_pages_noprof()
-> get_page_from_freelist()
-> rmqueue()
-> rmqueue_pcplist()
-> __rmqueue_pcplist()
-> rmqueue_bulk()
-> rt_spin_lock()
The rq lock is a raw_spinlock_t. We can't sleep while holding
it. IOW, we can't call alloc_pages() in stack_depot_save_flags().
The task_tick_mm_cid() function with its task_work_add() call was
introduced by commit 223baf9d17f2 ("sched: Fix performance regression
introduced by mm_cid") in v6.4 kernel.
Fortunately, there is a kasan_record_aux_stack_noalloc() variant that
calls stack_depot_save_flags() while not allowing it to allocate
new pages. To allow task_tick_mm_cid() to use task_work without
page allocation, a new TWAF_NO_ALLOC flag is added to enable calling
kasan_record_aux_stack_noalloc() instead of kasan_record_aux_stack()
if set. The task_tick_mm_cid() function is modified to add this new flag.
The possible downside is the missing stack trace in a KASAN report due
to new page allocation required when task_work_add_noallloc() is called
which should be rare. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pinctrl: nuvoton: fix a double free in ma35_pinctrl_dt_node_to_map_func()
'new_map' is allocated using devm_* which takes care of freeing the
allocated data on device removal, call to
.dt_free_map = pinconf_generic_dt_free_map
double frees the map as pinconf_generic_dt_free_map() calls
pinctrl_utils_free_map().
Fix this by using kcalloc() instead of auto-managed devm_kcalloc(). |
