| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel before 6.1.13, there is a double free in net/mpls/af_mpls.c upon an allocation failure (for registering the sysctl table under a new location) during the renaming of a device. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtw89: 8852a: rfk: fix div 0 exception
The DPK is a kind of RF calibration whose algorithm is to fine tune
parameters and calibrate, and check the result. If the result isn't good
enough, it could adjust parameters and try again.
This issue is to read and show the result, but it could be a negative
calibration result that causes divisor 0 and core dump. So, fix it by
phy_div() that does division only if divisor isn't zero; otherwise,
zero is adopted.
divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 1 PID: 728 Comm: wpa_supplicant Not tainted 5.10.114-16019-g462a1661811a #1 <HASH:d024 28>
RIP: 0010:rtw8852a_dpk+0x14ae/0x288f [rtw89_core]
RSP: 0018:ffffa9bb412a7520 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000000180fc RDI: ffffa141d01023c0
RBP: ffffa9bb412a76a0 R08: 0000000000001319 R09: 00000000ffffff92
R10: ffffffffc0292de3 R11: ffffffffc00d2f51 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffa141d01023c0 R14: ffffffffc0290250 R15: ffffa141d0102638
FS: 00007fa99f5c2740(0000) GS:ffffa142e5e80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000013e8e010 CR3: 0000000110d2c000 CR4: 0000000000750ee0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
rtw89_core_sta_add+0x95/0x9c [rtw89_core <HASH:d239 29>]
rtw89_ops_sta_state+0x5d/0x108 [rtw89_core <HASH:d239 29>]
drv_sta_state+0x115/0x66f [mac80211 <HASH:81fe 30>]
sta_info_insert_rcu+0x45c/0x713 [mac80211 <HASH:81fe 30>]
sta_info_insert+0xf/0x1b [mac80211 <HASH:81fe 30>]
ieee80211_prep_connection+0x9d6/0xb0c [mac80211 <HASH:81fe 30>]
ieee80211_mgd_auth+0x2aa/0x352 [mac80211 <HASH:81fe 30>]
cfg80211_mlme_auth+0x160/0x1f6 [cfg80211 <HASH:00cd 31>]
nl80211_authenticate+0x2e5/0x306 [cfg80211 <HASH:00cd 31>]
genl_rcv_msg+0x371/0x3a1
? nl80211_stop_sched_scan+0xe5/0xe5 [cfg80211 <HASH:00cd 31>]
? genl_rcv+0x36/0x36
netlink_rcv_skb+0x8a/0xf9
genl_rcv+0x28/0x36
netlink_unicast+0x27b/0x3a0
netlink_sendmsg+0x2aa/0x469
sock_sendmsg_nosec+0x49/0x4d
____sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x213
__sys_sendmsg+0xec/0x157
? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0xd7/0x116
do_syscall_64+0x43/0x55
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x7fa99f6e689b |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: atlantic: fix aq_vec index out of range error
The final update statement of the for loop exceeds the array range, the
dereference of self->aq_vec[i] is not checked and then leads to the
index out of range error.
Also fixed this kind of coding style in other for loop.
[ 97.937604] UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/ethernet/aquantia/atlantic/aq_nic.c:1404:48
[ 97.937607] index 8 is out of range for type 'aq_vec_s *[8]'
[ 97.937608] CPU: 38 PID: 3767 Comm: kworker/u256:18 Not tainted 5.19.0+ #2
[ 97.937610] Hardware name: Dell Inc. Precision 7865 Tower/, BIOS 1.0.0 06/12/2022
[ 97.937611] Workqueue: events_unbound async_run_entry_fn
[ 97.937616] Call Trace:
[ 97.937617] <TASK>
[ 97.937619] dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x63
[ 97.937624] dump_stack+0x10/0x16
[ 97.937626] ubsan_epilogue+0x9/0x3f
[ 97.937627] __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold+0x44/0x49
[ 97.937629] ? __scm_send+0x348/0x440
[ 97.937632] ? aq_vec_stop+0x72/0x80 [atlantic]
[ 97.937639] aq_nic_stop+0x1b6/0x1c0 [atlantic]
[ 97.937644] aq_suspend_common+0x88/0x90 [atlantic]
[ 97.937648] aq_pm_suspend_poweroff+0xe/0x20 [atlantic]
[ 97.937653] pci_pm_suspend+0x7e/0x1a0
[ 97.937655] ? pci_pm_suspend_noirq+0x2b0/0x2b0
[ 97.937657] dpm_run_callback+0x54/0x190
[ 97.937660] __device_suspend+0x14c/0x4d0
[ 97.937661] async_suspend+0x23/0x70
[ 97.937663] async_run_entry_fn+0x33/0x120
[ 97.937664] process_one_work+0x21f/0x3f0
[ 97.937666] worker_thread+0x4a/0x3c0
[ 97.937668] ? process_one_work+0x3f0/0x3f0
[ 97.937669] kthread+0xf0/0x120
[ 97.937671] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
[ 97.937672] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[ 97.937676] </TASK>
v2. fixed "warning: variable 'aq_vec' set but not used"
v3. simplified a for loop |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: do not allow CHAIN_ID to refer to another table
When doing lookups for chains on the same batch by using its ID, a chain
from a different table can be used. If a rule is added to a table but
refers to a chain in a different table, it will be linked to the chain in
table2, but would have expressions referring to objects in table1.
Then, when table1 is removed, the rule will not be removed as its linked to
a chain in table2. When expressions in the rule are processed or removed,
that will lead to a use-after-free.
When looking for chains by ID, use the table that was used for the lookup
by name, and only return chains belonging to that same table. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
posix-cpu-timers: Cleanup CPU timers before freeing them during exec
Commit 55e8c8eb2c7b ("posix-cpu-timers: Store a reference to a pid not a
task") started looking up tasks by PID when deleting a CPU timer.
When a non-leader thread calls execve, it will switch PIDs with the leader
process. Then, as it calls exit_itimers, posix_cpu_timer_del cannot find
the task because the timer still points out to the old PID.
That means that armed timers won't be disarmed, that is, they won't be
removed from the timerqueue_list. exit_itimers will still release their
memory, and when that list is later processed, it leads to a
use-after-free.
Clean up the timers from the de-threaded task before freeing them. This
prevents a reported use-after-free. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: flowtable: fix stuck flows on cleanup due to pending work
To clear the flow table on flow table free, the following sequence
normally happens in order:
1) gc_step work is stopped to disable any further stats/del requests.
2) All flow table entries are set to teardown state.
3) Run gc_step which will queue HW del work for each flow table entry.
4) Waiting for the above del work to finish (flush).
5) Run gc_step again, deleting all entries from the flow table.
6) Flow table is freed.
But if a flow table entry already has pending HW stats or HW add work
step 3 will not queue HW del work (it will be skipped), step 4 will wait
for the pending add/stats to finish, and step 5 will queue HW del work
which might execute after freeing of the flow table.
To fix the above, this patch flushes the pending work, then it sets the
teardown flag to all flows in the flowtable and it forces a garbage
collector run to queue work to remove the flows from hardware, then it
flushes this new pending work and (finally) it forces another garbage
collector run to remove the entry from the software flowtable.
Stack trace:
[47773.882335] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in down_read+0x99/0x460
[47773.883634] Write of size 8 at addr ffff888103b45aa8 by task kworker/u20:6/543704
[47773.885634] CPU: 3 PID: 543704 Comm: kworker/u20:6 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc7+ #2
[47773.886745] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009)
[47773.888438] Workqueue: nf_ft_offload_del flow_offload_work_handler [nf_flow_table]
[47773.889727] Call Trace:
[47773.890214] dump_stack+0xbb/0x107
[47773.890818] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x18/0x140
[47773.892990] kasan_report.cold+0x7c/0xd8
[47773.894459] kasan_check_range+0x145/0x1a0
[47773.895174] down_read+0x99/0x460
[47773.899706] nf_flow_offload_tuple+0x24f/0x3c0 [nf_flow_table]
[47773.907137] flow_offload_work_handler+0x72d/0xbe0 [nf_flow_table]
[47773.913372] process_one_work+0x8ac/0x14e0
[47773.921325]
[47773.921325] Allocated by task 592159:
[47773.922031] kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40
[47773.922730] __kasan_kmalloc+0x7a/0x90
[47773.923411] tcf_ct_flow_table_get+0x3cb/0x1230 [act_ct]
[47773.924363] tcf_ct_init+0x71c/0x1156 [act_ct]
[47773.925207] tcf_action_init_1+0x45b/0x700
[47773.925987] tcf_action_init+0x453/0x6b0
[47773.926692] tcf_exts_validate+0x3d0/0x600
[47773.927419] fl_change+0x757/0x4a51 [cls_flower]
[47773.928227] tc_new_tfilter+0x89a/0x2070
[47773.936652]
[47773.936652] Freed by task 543704:
[47773.937303] kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40
[47773.938039] kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30
[47773.938731] kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30
[47773.939467] __kasan_slab_free+0xe7/0x120
[47773.940194] slab_free_freelist_hook+0x86/0x190
[47773.941038] kfree+0xce/0x3a0
[47773.941644] tcf_ct_flow_table_cleanup_work
Original patch description and stack trace by Paul Blakey. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
BPF: Fix potential bad pointer dereference in bpf_sys_bpf()
The bpf_sys_bpf() helper function allows an eBPF program to load another
eBPF program from within the kernel. In this case the argument union
bpf_attr pointer (as well as the insns and license pointers inside) is a
kernel address instead of a userspace address (which is the case of a
usual bpf() syscall). To make the memory copying process in the syscall
work in both cases, bpfptr_t was introduced to wrap around the pointer
and distinguish its origin. Specifically, when copying memory contents
from a bpfptr_t, a copy_from_user() is performed in case of a userspace
address and a memcpy() is performed for a kernel address.
This can lead to problems because the in-kernel pointer is never checked
for validity. The problem happens when an eBPF syscall program tries to
call bpf_sys_bpf() to load a program but provides a bad insns pointer --
say 0xdeadbeef -- in the bpf_attr union. The helper calls __sys_bpf()
which would then call bpf_prog_load() to load the program.
bpf_prog_load() is responsible for copying the eBPF instructions to the
newly allocated memory for the program; it creates a kernel bpfptr_t for
insns and invokes copy_from_bpfptr(). Internally, all bpfptr_t
operations are backed by the corresponding sockptr_t operations, which
performs direct memcpy() on kernel pointers for copy_from/strncpy_from
operations. Therefore, the code is always happy to dereference the bad
pointer to trigger a un-handle-able page fault and in turn an oops.
However, this is not supposed to happen because at that point the eBPF
program is already verified and should not cause a memory error.
Sample KASAN trace:
[ 25.685056][ T228] ==================================================================
[ 25.685680][ T228] BUG: KASAN: user-memory-access in copy_from_bpfptr+0x21/0x30
[ 25.686210][ T228] Read of size 80 at addr 00000000deadbeef by task poc/228
[ 25.686732][ T228]
[ 25.686893][ T228] CPU: 3 PID: 228 Comm: poc Not tainted 5.19.0-rc7 #7
[ 25.687375][ T228] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS d55cb5a 04/01/2014
[ 25.687991][ T228] Call Trace:
[ 25.688223][ T228] <TASK>
[ 25.688429][ T228] dump_stack_lvl+0x73/0x9e
[ 25.688747][ T228] print_report+0xea/0x200
[ 25.689061][ T228] ? copy_from_bpfptr+0x21/0x30
[ 25.689401][ T228] ? _printk+0x54/0x6e
[ 25.689693][ T228] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x70/0xd0
[ 25.690071][ T228] ? copy_from_bpfptr+0x21/0x30
[ 25.690412][ T228] kasan_report+0xb5/0xe0
[ 25.690716][ T228] ? copy_from_bpfptr+0x21/0x30
[ 25.691059][ T228] kasan_check_range+0x2bd/0x2e0
[ 25.691405][ T228] ? copy_from_bpfptr+0x21/0x30
[ 25.691734][ T228] memcpy+0x25/0x60
[ 25.692000][ T228] copy_from_bpfptr+0x21/0x30
[ 25.692328][ T228] bpf_prog_load+0x604/0x9e0
[ 25.692653][ T228] ? cap_capable+0xb4/0xe0
[ 25.692956][ T228] ? security_capable+0x4f/0x70
[ 25.693324][ T228] __sys_bpf+0x3af/0x580
[ 25.693635][ T228] bpf_sys_bpf+0x45/0x240
[ 25.693937][ T228] bpf_prog_f0ec79a5a3caca46_bpf_func1+0xa2/0xbd
[ 25.694394][ T228] bpf_prog_run_pin_on_cpu+0x2f/0xb0
[ 25.694756][ T228] bpf_prog_test_run_syscall+0x146/0x1c0
[ 25.695144][ T228] bpf_prog_test_run+0x172/0x190
[ 25.695487][ T228] __sys_bpf+0x2c5/0x580
[ 25.695776][ T228] __x64_sys_bpf+0x3a/0x50
[ 25.696084][ T228] do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90
[ 25.696393][ T228] ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x50/0x60
[ 25.696815][ T228] ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x36/0xa0
[ 25.697202][ T228] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x20/0x40
[ 25.697586][ T228] ? do_syscall_64+0x6e/0x90
[ 25.697899][ T228] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 25.698312][ T228] RIP: 0033:0x7f6d543fb759
[ 25.698624][ T228] Code: 08 5b 89 e8 5d c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/hugetlb: avoid corrupting page->mapping in hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte
In MCOPY_ATOMIC_CONTINUE case with a non-shared VMA, pages in the page
cache are installed in the ptes. But hugepage_add_new_anon_rmap is called
for them mistakenly because they're not vm_shared. This will corrupt the
page->mapping used by page cache code. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915: fix null pointer dereference
Asus chromebook CX550 crashes during boot on v5.17-rc1 kernel.
The root cause is null pointer defeference of bi_next
in tgl_get_bw_info() in drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_bw.c.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000002e
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G U 5.17.0-rc1
Hardware name: Google Delbin/Delbin, BIOS Google_Delbin.13672.156.3 05/14/2021
RIP: 0010:tgl_get_bw_info+0x2de/0x510
...
[ 2.554467] Call Trace:
[ 2.554467] <TASK>
[ 2.554467] intel_bw_init_hw+0x14a/0x434
[ 2.554467] ? _printk+0x59/0x73
[ 2.554467] ? _dev_err+0x77/0x91
[ 2.554467] i915_driver_hw_probe+0x329/0x33e
[ 2.554467] i915_driver_probe+0x4c8/0x638
[ 2.554467] i915_pci_probe+0xf8/0x14e
[ 2.554467] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x12/0x2c
[ 2.554467] pci_device_probe+0xaa/0x142
[ 2.554467] really_probe+0x13f/0x2f4
[ 2.554467] __driver_probe_device+0x9e/0xd3
[ 2.554467] driver_probe_device+0x24/0x7c
[ 2.554467] __driver_attach+0xba/0xcf
[ 2.554467] ? driver_attach+0x1f/0x1f
[ 2.554467] bus_for_each_dev+0x8c/0xc0
[ 2.554467] bus_add_driver+0x11b/0x1f7
[ 2.554467] driver_register+0x60/0xea
[ 2.554467] ? mipi_dsi_bus_init+0x16/0x16
[ 2.554467] i915_init+0x2c/0xb9
[ 2.554467] ? mipi_dsi_bus_init+0x16/0x16
[ 2.554467] do_one_initcall+0x12e/0x2b3
[ 2.554467] do_initcall_level+0xd6/0xf3
[ 2.554467] do_initcalls+0x4e/0x79
[ 2.554467] kernel_init_freeable+0xed/0x14d
[ 2.554467] ? rest_init+0xc1/0xc1
[ 2.554467] kernel_init+0x1a/0x120
[ 2.554467] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[ 2.554467] </TASK>
...
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
(cherry picked from commit c247cd03898c4c43c3bce6d4014730403bc13032) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: cdns3: fix random warning message when driver load
Warning log:
[ 4.141392] Unexpected gfp: 0x4 (GFP_DMA32). Fixing up to gfp: 0xa20 (GFP_ATOMIC). Fix your code!
[ 4.150340] CPU: 1 PID: 175 Comm: 1-0050 Not tainted 5.15.5-00039-g2fd9ae1b568c #20
[ 4.158010] Hardware name: Freescale i.MX8QXP MEK (DT)
[ 4.163155] Call trace:
[ 4.165600] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1b0
[ 4.169286] show_stack+0x18/0x68
[ 4.172611] dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x84
[ 4.176286] dump_stack+0x18/0x34
[ 4.179613] kmalloc_fix_flags+0x60/0x88
[ 4.183550] new_slab+0x334/0x370
[ 4.186878] ___slab_alloc.part.108+0x4d4/0x748
[ 4.191419] __slab_alloc.isra.109+0x30/0x78
[ 4.195702] kmem_cache_alloc+0x40c/0x420
[ 4.199725] dma_pool_alloc+0xac/0x1f8
[ 4.203486] cdns3_allocate_trb_pool+0xb4/0xd0
pool_alloc_page(struct dma_pool *pool, gfp_t mem_flags)
{
...
page = kmalloc(sizeof(*page), mem_flags);
page->vaddr = dma_alloc_coherent(pool->dev, pool->allocation,
&page->dma, mem_flags);
...
}
kmalloc was called with mem_flags, which is passed down in
cdns3_allocate_trb_pool() and have GFP_DMA32 flags.
kmall_fix_flags() report warning.
GFP_DMA32 is not useful at all. dma_alloc_coherent() will handle
DMA memory region correctly by pool->dev. GFP_DMA32 can be removed
safely. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vfio: Split migration ops from main device ops
vfio core checks whether the driver sets some migration op (e.g.
set_state/get_state) and accordingly calls its op.
However, currently mlx5 driver sets the above ops without regards to its
migration caps.
This might lead to unexpected usage/Oops if user space may call to the
above ops even if the driver doesn't support migration. As for example,
the migration state_mutex is not initialized in that case.
The cleanest way to manage that seems to split the migration ops from
the main device ops, this will let the driver setting them separately
from the main ops when it's applicable.
As part of that, validate ops construction on registration and include a
check for VFIO_MIGRATION_STOP_COPY since the uAPI claims it must be set
in migration_flags.
HISI driver was changed as well to match this scheme.
This scheme may enable down the road to come with some extra group of
ops (e.g. DMA log) that can be set without regards to the other options
based on driver caps. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: Fix use-after-free on amdgpu_bo_list mutex
If amdgpu_cs_vm_handling returns r != 0, then it will unlock the
bo_list_mutex inside the function amdgpu_cs_vm_handling and again on
amdgpu_cs_parser_fini. This problem results in the following
use-after-free problem:
[ 220.280990] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 220.281000] refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
[ 220.281019] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3746 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xba/0x110
[ 220.281029] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 220.281415] CPU: 1 PID: 3746 Comm: chrome:cs0 Tainted: G W L ------- --- 5.20.0-0.rc0.20220812git7ebfc85e2cd7.10.fc38.x86_64 #1
[ 220.281421] Hardware name: System manufacturer System Product Name/ROG STRIX X570-I GAMING, BIOS 4403 04/27/2022
[ 220.281426] RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xba/0x110
[ 220.281431] Code: 01 01 e8 79 4a 6f 00 0f 0b e9 42 47 a5 00 80 3d de
7e be 01 00 75 85 48 c7 c7 f8 98 8e 98 c6 05 ce 7e be 01 01 e8 56 4a
6f 00 <0f> 0b e9 1f 47 a5 00 80 3d b9 7e be 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff 48
c7
[ 220.281437] RSP: 0018:ffffb4b0d18d7a80 EFLAGS: 00010282
[ 220.281443] RAX: 0000000000000026 RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 220.281448] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff988d06dc RDI: 00000000ffffffff
[ 220.281452] RBP: 00000000ffffffff R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffb4b0d18d7930
[ 220.281457] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffffa0672e2fffe8 R12: ffffa058ca360400
[ 220.281461] R13: ffffa05846c50a18 R14: 00000000fffffe00 R15: 0000000000000003
[ 220.281465] FS: 00007f82683e06c0(0000) GS:ffffa066e2e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 220.281470] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 220.281475] CR2: 00003590005cc000 CR3: 00000001fca46000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0
[ 220.281480] Call Trace:
[ 220.281485] <TASK>
[ 220.281490] amdgpu_cs_ioctl+0x4e2/0x2070 [amdgpu]
[ 220.281806] ? amdgpu_cs_find_mapping+0xe0/0xe0 [amdgpu]
[ 220.282028] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xa4/0x150
[ 220.282043] drm_ioctl+0x21f/0x420
[ 220.282053] ? amdgpu_cs_find_mapping+0xe0/0xe0 [amdgpu]
[ 220.282275] ? lock_release+0x14f/0x460
[ 220.282282] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x30/0x60
[ 220.282290] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x30/0x60
[ 220.282297] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7d/0x100
[ 220.282305] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x40/0x60
[ 220.282317] amdgpu_drm_ioctl+0x4a/0x80 [amdgpu]
[ 220.282534] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x90/0xd0
[ 220.282545] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x80
[ 220.282551] ? futex_wake+0x6c/0x150
[ 220.282568] ? lock_is_held_type+0xe8/0x140
[ 220.282580] ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80
[ 220.282585] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7d/0x100
[ 220.282592] ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80
[ 220.282597] ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80
[ 220.282602] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7d/0x100
[ 220.282609] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 220.282616] RIP: 0033:0x7f8282a4f8bf
[ 220.282639] Code: 00 48 89 44 24 18 31 c0 48 8d 44 24 60 c7 04 24 10
00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8d 44 24 20 48 89 44 24 10 b8 10 00 00 00
0f 05 <89> c2 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 18 48 8b 44 24 18 64 48 2b 04 25 28 00
00
[ 220.282644] RSP: 002b:00007f82683df410 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
[ 220.282651] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f82683df588 RCX: 00007f8282a4f8bf
[ 220.282655] RDX: 00007f82683df4d0 RSI: 00000000c0186444 RDI: 0000000000000018
[ 220.282659] RBP: 00007f82683df4d0 R08: 00007f82683df5e0 R09: 00007f82683df4b0
[ 220.282663] R10: 00001d04000a0600 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000c0186444
[ 220.282667] R13: 0000000000000018 R14: 00007f82683df588 R15: 0000000000000003
[ 220.282689] </TASK>
[ 220.282693] irq event stamp: 6232311
[ 220.282697] hardirqs last enabled at (6232319): [<ffffffff9718cd7e>] __up_console_sem+0x5e/0x70
[ 220.282704] hardirqs last disabled at (6232326): [<ffffffff9718cd63>] __up_console_sem+0x43/0x70
[ 220.282709] softirqs last enabled at (6232072): [<ffffffff970ff669>] __irq_exit_rcu+0xf9/0x170
[ 220.282716] softirqs last disabled at (6232061): [<ffffffff97
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Do mark_chain_precision for ARG_CONST_ALLOC_SIZE_OR_ZERO
Precision markers need to be propagated whenever we have an ARG_CONST_*
style argument, as the verifier cannot consider imprecise scalars to be
equivalent for the purposes of states_equal check when such arguments
refine the return value (in this case, set mem_size for PTR_TO_MEM). The
resultant mem_size for the R0 is derived from the constant value, and if
the verifier incorrectly prunes states considering them equivalent where
such arguments exist (by seeing that both registers have reg->precise as
false in regsafe), we can end up with invalid programs passing the
verifier which can do access beyond what should have been the correct
mem_size in that explored state.
To show a concrete example of the problem:
0000000000000000 <prog>:
0: r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 80)
1: r1 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 76)
2: r3 = r1
3: r3 += 4
4: if r3 > r2 goto +18 <LBB5_5>
5: w2 = 0
6: *(u32 *)(r1 + 0) = r2
7: r1 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 0)
8: r2 = 1
9: if w1 == 0 goto +1 <LBB5_3>
10: r2 = -1
0000000000000058 <LBB5_3>:
11: r1 = 0 ll
13: r3 = 0
14: call bpf_ringbuf_reserve
15: if r0 == 0 goto +7 <LBB5_5>
16: r1 = r0
17: r1 += 16777215
18: w2 = 0
19: *(u8 *)(r1 + 0) = r2
20: r1 = r0
21: r2 = 0
22: call bpf_ringbuf_submit
00000000000000b8 <LBB5_5>:
23: w0 = 0
24: exit
For the first case, the single line execution's exploration will prune
the search at insn 14 for the branch insn 9's second leg as it will be
verified first using r2 = -1 (UINT_MAX), while as w1 at insn 9 will
always be 0 so at runtime we don't get error for being greater than
UINT_MAX/4 from bpf_ringbuf_reserve. The verifier during regsafe just
sees reg->precise as false for both r2 registers in both states, hence
considers them equal for purposes of states_equal.
If we propagated precise markers using the backtracking support, we
would use the precise marking to then ensure that old r2 (UINT_MAX) was
within the new r2 (1) and this would never be true, so the verification
would rightfully fail.
The end result is that the out of bounds access at instruction 19 would
be permitted without this fix.
Note that reg->precise is always set to true when user does not have
CAP_BPF (or when subprog count is greater than 1 (i.e. use of any static
or global functions)), hence this is only a problem when precision marks
need to be explicitly propagated (i.e. privileged users with CAP_BPF).
A simplified test case has been included in the next patch to prevent
future regressions. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
clk: qcom: ipq8074: dont disable gcc_sleep_clk_src
Once the usb sleep clocks are disabled, clock framework is trying to
disable the sleep clock source also.
However, it seems that it cannot be disabled and trying to do so produces:
[ 245.436390] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 245.441233] gcc_sleep_clk_src status stuck at 'on'
[ 245.441254] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 223 at clk_branch_wait+0x130/0x140
[ 245.450435] Modules linked in: xhci_plat_hcd xhci_hcd dwc3 dwc3_qcom leds_gpio
[ 245.456601] CPU: 2 PID: 223 Comm: sh Not tainted 5.18.0-rc4 #215
[ 245.463889] Hardware name: Xiaomi AX9000 (DT)
[ 245.470050] pstate: 204000c5 (nzCv daIF +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 245.474307] pc : clk_branch_wait+0x130/0x140
[ 245.481073] lr : clk_branch_wait+0x130/0x140
[ 245.485588] sp : ffffffc009f2bad0
[ 245.489838] x29: ffffffc009f2bad0 x28: ffffff8003e6c800 x27: 0000000000000000
[ 245.493057] x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffffff800226ef20
[ 245.500175] x23: ffffffc0089ff550 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffffffc008476ad0
[ 245.507294] x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffffffc00965ac70 x18: fffffffffffc51a7
[ 245.514413] x17: 68702e3030303837 x16: 3a6d726f6674616c x15: ffffffc089f2b777
[ 245.521531] x14: ffffffc0095c9d18 x13: 0000000000000129 x12: 0000000000000129
[ 245.528649] x11: 00000000ffffffea x10: ffffffc009621d18 x9 : 0000000000000001
[ 245.535767] x8 : 0000000000000001 x7 : 0000000000017fe8 x6 : 0000000000000001
[ 245.542885] x5 : ffffff803fdca6d8 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000027
[ 245.550002] x2 : 0000000000000027 x1 : 0000000000000023 x0 : 0000000000000026
[ 245.557122] Call trace:
[ 245.564229] clk_branch_wait+0x130/0x140
[ 245.566490] clk_branch2_disable+0x2c/0x40
[ 245.570656] clk_core_disable+0x60/0xb0
[ 245.574561] clk_core_disable+0x68/0xb0
[ 245.578293] clk_disable+0x30/0x50
[ 245.582113] dwc3_qcom_remove+0x60/0xc0 [dwc3_qcom]
[ 245.585588] platform_remove+0x28/0x60
[ 245.590361] device_remove+0x4c/0x80
[ 245.594179] device_release_driver_internal+0x1dc/0x230
[ 245.597914] device_driver_detach+0x18/0x30
[ 245.602861] unbind_store+0xec/0x110
[ 245.607027] drv_attr_store+0x24/0x40
[ 245.610847] sysfs_kf_write+0x44/0x60
[ 245.614405] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x128/0x1c0
[ 245.618052] new_sync_write+0xc0/0x130
[ 245.622391] vfs_write+0x1d4/0x2a0
[ 245.626123] ksys_write+0x58/0xe0
[ 245.629508] __arm64_sys_write+0x1c/0x30
[ 245.632895] invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x5c/0x110
[ 245.636890] do_el0_svc+0xa0/0x150
[ 245.641488] el0_svc+0x18/0x60
[ 245.644872] el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa4/0x130
[ 245.647914] el0t_64_sync+0x174/0x178
[ 245.652340] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
So, add CLK_IS_CRITICAL flag to the clock so that the kernel won't try
to disable the sleep clock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, x86: fix freeing of not-finalized bpf_prog_pack
syzbot reported a few issues with bpf_prog_pack [1], [2]. This only happens
with multiple subprogs. In jit_subprogs(), we first call bpf_int_jit_compile()
on each sub program. And then, we call it on each sub program again. jit_data
is not freed in the first call of bpf_int_jit_compile(). Similarly we don't
call bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize() in the first call of bpf_int_jit_compile().
If bpf_int_jit_compile() failed for one sub program, we will call
bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize() for this sub program. However, we don't have a
chance to call it for other sub programs. Then we will hit "goto out_free" in
jit_subprogs(), and call bpf_jit_free on some subprograms that haven't got
bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize() yet.
At this point, bpf_jit_binary_pack_free() is called and the whole 2MB page is
freed erroneously.
Fix this with a custom bpf_jit_free() for x86_64, which calls
bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize() if necessary. Also, with custom
bpf_jit_free(), bpf_prog_aux->use_bpf_prog_pack is not needed any more,
remove it.
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=2f649ec6d2eea1495a8f
[2] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=87f65c75f4a72db05445 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/damon/reclaim: fix potential memory leak in damon_reclaim_init()
damon_reclaim_init() allocates a memory chunk for ctx with
damon_new_ctx(). When damon_select_ops() fails, ctx is not released,
which will lead to a memory leak.
We should release the ctx with damon_destroy_ctx() when damon_select_ops()
fails to fix the memory leak. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: Fix simplification of devm_spi_register_controller
This reverts commit 59ebbe40fb51 ("spi: simplify
devm_spi_register_controller").
If devm_add_action() fails in devm_add_action_or_reset(),
devm_spi_unregister() will be called, it decreases the
refcount of 'ctlr->dev' to 0, then it will cause uaf in
the drivers that calling spi_put_controller() in error path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: fix NULL dereference at band check in starting tx ba session
In MLD connection, link_data/link_conf are dynamically allocated. They
don't point to vif->bss_conf. So, there will be no chanreq assigned to
vif->bss_conf and then the chan will be NULL. Tweak the code to check
ht_supported/vht_supported/has_he/has_eht on sta deflink.
Crash log (with rtw89 version under MLO development):
[ 9890.526087] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
[ 9890.526102] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 9890.526105] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 9890.526109] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 9890.526114] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
[ 9890.526119] CPU: 2 PID: 6367 Comm: kworker/u16:2 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE 6.9.0 #1
[ 9890.526123] Hardware name: LENOVO 2356AD1/2356AD1, BIOS G7ETB3WW (2.73 ) 11/28/2018
[ 9890.526126] Workqueue: phy2 rtw89_core_ba_work [rtw89_core]
[ 9890.526203] RIP: 0010:ieee80211_start_tx_ba_session (net/mac80211/agg-tx.c:618 (discriminator 1)) mac80211
[ 9890.526279] Code: f7 e8 d5 93 3e ea 48 83 c4 28 89 d8 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc 49 8b 84 24 e0 f1 ff ff 48 8b 80 90 1b 00 00 <83> 38 03 0f 84 37 fe ff ff bb ea ff ff ff eb cc 49 8b 84 24 10 f3
All code
========
0: f7 e8 imul %eax
2: d5 (bad)
3: 93 xchg %eax,%ebx
4: 3e ea ds (bad)
6: 48 83 c4 28 add $0x28,%rsp
a: 89 d8 mov %ebx,%eax
c: 5b pop %rbx
d: 41 5c pop %r12
f: 41 5d pop %r13
11: 41 5e pop %r14
13: 41 5f pop %r15
15: 5d pop %rbp
16: c3 retq
17: cc int3
18: cc int3
19: cc int3
1a: cc int3
1b: 49 8b 84 24 e0 f1 ff mov -0xe20(%r12),%rax
22: ff
23: 48 8b 80 90 1b 00 00 mov 0x1b90(%rax),%rax
2a:* 83 38 03 cmpl $0x3,(%rax) <-- trapping instruction
2d: 0f 84 37 fe ff ff je 0xfffffffffffffe6a
33: bb ea ff ff ff mov $0xffffffea,%ebx
38: eb cc jmp 0x6
3a: 49 rex.WB
3b: 8b .byte 0x8b
3c: 84 24 10 test %ah,(%rax,%rdx,1)
3f: f3 repz
Code starting with the faulting instruction
===========================================
0: 83 38 03 cmpl $0x3,(%rax)
3: 0f 84 37 fe ff ff je 0xfffffffffffffe40
9: bb ea ff ff ff mov $0xffffffea,%ebx
e: eb cc jmp 0xffffffffffffffdc
10: 49 rex.WB
11: 8b .byte 0x8b
12: 84 24 10 test %ah,(%rax,%rdx,1)
15: f3 repz
[ 9890.526285] RSP: 0018:ffffb8db09013d68 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 9890.526291] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff9308e0d656c8
[ 9890.526295] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffab99460b RDI: ffffffffab9a7685
[ 9890.526300] RBP: ffffb8db09013db8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000873
[ 9890.526304] R10: ffff9308e0d64800 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffff9308e5ff6e70
[ 9890.526308] R13: ffff930952500e20 R14: ffff9309192a8c00 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 9890.526313] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff930b4e700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 9890.526316] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 9890.526318] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000391c58005 CR4: 00000000001706f0
[ 9890.526321] Call Trace:
[ 9890.526324] <TASK>
[ 9890.526327] ? show_regs (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:479)
[ 9890.526335] ? __die (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:421 arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:434)
[ 9890.526340] ? page_fault_oops (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:713)
[ 9890.526347] ? search_module_extables (kernel/module/main.c:3256 (discriminator
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: avoid dividing by 0 in mb_update_avg_fragment_size() when block bitmap corrupt
Determine if bb_fragments is 0 instead of determining bb_free to eliminate
the risk of dividing by zero when the block bitmap is corrupted. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bfq: Avoid merging queues with different parents
It can happen that the parent of a bfqq changes between the moment we
decide two queues are worth to merge (and set bic->stable_merge_bfqq)
and the moment bfq_setup_merge() is called. This can happen e.g. because
the process submitted IO for a different cgroup and thus bfqq got
reparented. It can even happen that the bfqq we are merging with has
parent cgroup that is already offline and going to be destroyed in which
case the merge can lead to use-after-free issues such as:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __bfq_deactivate_entity+0x9cb/0xa50
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800693c0c0 by task runc:[2:INIT]/10544
CPU: 0 PID: 10544 Comm: runc:[2:INIT] Tainted: G E 5.15.2-0.g5fb85fd-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed (unreleased) f1f3b891c72369aebecd2e43e4641a6358867c70
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack_lvl+0x46/0x5a
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x140
? __bfq_deactivate_entity+0x9cb/0xa50
kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b
? __bfq_deactivate_entity+0x9cb/0xa50
__bfq_deactivate_entity+0x9cb/0xa50
? update_curr+0x32f/0x5d0
bfq_deactivate_entity+0xa0/0x1d0
bfq_del_bfqq_busy+0x28a/0x420
? resched_curr+0x116/0x1d0
? bfq_requeue_bfqq+0x70/0x70
? check_preempt_wakeup+0x52b/0xbc0
__bfq_bfqq_expire+0x1a2/0x270
bfq_bfqq_expire+0xd16/0x2160
? try_to_wake_up+0x4ee/0x1260
? bfq_end_wr_async_queues+0xe0/0xe0
? _raw_write_unlock_bh+0x60/0x60
? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x81/0xe0
bfq_idle_slice_timer+0x109/0x280
? bfq_dispatch_request+0x4870/0x4870
__hrtimer_run_queues+0x37d/0x700
? enqueue_hrtimer+0x1b0/0x1b0
? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0xd/0x10
? ktime_get_update_offsets_now+0x6f/0x280
hrtimer_interrupt+0x2c8/0x740
Fix the problem by checking that the parent of the two bfqqs we are
merging in bfq_setup_merge() is the same. |
