| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf: Fix event leak upon exit
When a task is scheduled out, pending sigtrap deliveries are deferred
to the target task upon resume to userspace via task_work.
However failures while adding an event's callback to the task_work
engine are ignored. And since the last call for events exit happen
after task work is eventually closed, there is a small window during
which pending sigtrap can be queued though ignored, leaking the event
refcount addition such as in the following scenario:
TASK A
-----
do_exit()
exit_task_work(tsk);
<IRQ>
perf_event_overflow()
event->pending_sigtrap = pending_id;
irq_work_queue(&event->pending_irq);
</IRQ>
=========> PREEMPTION: TASK A -> TASK B
event_sched_out()
event->pending_sigtrap = 0;
atomic_long_inc_not_zero(&event->refcount)
// FAILS: task work has exited
task_work_add(&event->pending_task)
[...]
<IRQ WORK>
perf_pending_irq()
// early return: event->oncpu = -1
</IRQ WORK>
[...]
=========> TASK B -> TASK A
perf_event_exit_task(tsk)
perf_event_exit_event()
free_event()
WARN(atomic_long_cmpxchg(&event->refcount, 1, 0) != 1)
// leak event due to unexpected refcount == 2
As a result the event is never released while the task exits.
Fix this with appropriate task_work_add()'s error handling. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf: Fix event leak upon exec and file release
The perf pending task work is never waited upon the matching event
release. In the case of a child event, released via free_event()
directly, this can potentially result in a leaked event, such as in the
following scenario that doesn't even require a weak IRQ work
implementation to trigger:
schedule()
prepare_task_switch()
=======> <NMI>
perf_event_overflow()
event->pending_sigtrap = ...
irq_work_queue(&event->pending_irq)
<======= </NMI>
perf_event_task_sched_out()
event_sched_out()
event->pending_sigtrap = 0;
atomic_long_inc_not_zero(&event->refcount)
task_work_add(&event->pending_task)
finish_lock_switch()
=======> <IRQ>
perf_pending_irq()
//do nothing, rely on pending task work
<======= </IRQ>
begin_new_exec()
perf_event_exit_task()
perf_event_exit_event()
// If is child event
free_event()
WARN(atomic_long_cmpxchg(&event->refcount, 1, 0) != 1)
// event is leaked
Similar scenarios can also happen with perf_event_remove_on_exec() or
simply against concurrent perf_event_release().
Fix this with synchonizing against the possibly remaining pending task
work while freeing the event, just like is done with remaining pending
IRQ work. This means that the pending task callback neither need nor
should hold a reference to the event, preventing it from ever beeing
freed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/nouveau: prime: fix refcount underflow
Calling nouveau_bo_ref() on a nouveau_bo without initializing it (and
hence the backing ttm_bo) leads to a refcount underflow.
Instead of calling nouveau_bo_ref() in the unwind path of
drm_gem_object_init(), clean things up manually.
(cherry picked from commit 1b93f3e89d03cfc576636e195466a0d728ad8de5) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
lib: alloc_tag_module_unload must wait for pending kfree_rcu calls
Ben Greear reports following splat:
------------[ cut here ]------------
net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c:1114 module nf_nat func:nf_nat_register_fn has 256 allocated at module unload
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 10421 at lib/alloc_tag.c:168 alloc_tag_module_unload+0x22b/0x3f0
Modules linked in: nf_nat(-) btrfs ufs qnx4 hfsplus hfs minix vfat msdos fat
...
Hardware name: Default string Default string/SKYBAY, BIOS 5.12 08/04/2020
RIP: 0010:alloc_tag_module_unload+0x22b/0x3f0
codetag_unload_module+0x19b/0x2a0
? codetag_load_module+0x80/0x80
nf_nat module exit calls kfree_rcu on those addresses, but the free
operation is likely still pending by the time alloc_tag checks for leaks.
Wait for outstanding kfree_rcu operations to complete before checking
resolves this warning.
Reproducer:
unshare -n iptables-nft -t nat -A PREROUTING -p tcp
grep nf_nat /proc/allocinfo # will list 4 allocations
rmmod nft_chain_nat
rmmod nf_nat # will WARN.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: add comment] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: phy: Fix missing of_node_put() for leds
The call of of_get_child_by_name() will cause refcount incremented
for leds, if it succeeds, it should call of_node_put() to decrease
it, fix it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: add check for invalid name in btf_name_valid_section()
If the length of the name string is 1 and the value of name[0] is NULL
byte, an OOB vulnerability occurs in btf_name_valid_section() and the
return value is true, so the invalid name passes the check.
To solve this, you need to check if the first position is NULL byte and
if the first character is printable. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: handle errors from btrfs_dec_ref() properly
In walk_up_proc() we BUG_ON(ret) from btrfs_dec_ref(). This is
incorrect, we have proper error handling here, return the error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: replace BUG_ON() with error handling at update_ref_for_cow()
Instead of a BUG_ON() just return an error, log an error message and
abort the transaction in case we find an extent buffer belonging to the
relocation tree that doesn't have the full backref flag set. This is
unexpected and should never happen (save for bugs or a potential bad
memory). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix double put of @cfile in smb2_rename_path()
If smb2_set_path_attr() is called with a valid @cfile and returned
-EINVAL, we need to call cifs_get_writable_path() again as the
reference of @cfile was already dropped by previous smb2_compound_op()
call. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix qgroup reserve leaks in cow_file_range
In the buffered write path, the dirty page owns the qgroup reserve until
it creates an ordered_extent.
Therefore, any errors that occur before the ordered_extent is created
must free that reservation, or else the space is leaked. The fstest
generic/475 exercises various IO error paths, and is able to trigger
errors in cow_file_range where we fail to get to allocating the ordered
extent. Note that because we *do* clear delalloc, we are likely to
remove the inode from the delalloc list, so the inodes/pages to not have
invalidate/launder called on them in the commit abort path.
This results in failures at the unmount stage of the test that look like:
BTRFS: error (device dm-8 state EA) in cleanup_transaction:2018: errno=-5 IO failure
BTRFS: error (device dm-8 state EA) in btrfs_replace_file_extents:2416: errno=-5 IO failure
BTRFS warning (device dm-8 state EA): qgroup 0/5 has unreleased space, type 0 rsv 28672
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 22588 at fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:4333 close_ctree+0x222/0x4d0 [btrfs]
Modules linked in: btrfs blake2b_generic libcrc32c xor zstd_compress raid6_pq
CPU: 3 PID: 22588 Comm: umount Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 6.10.0-rc7-gab56fde445b8 #21
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:close_ctree+0x222/0x4d0 [btrfs]
RSP: 0018:ffffb4465283be00 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffffa1a1818e1000 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffb4465283bbe0 RDI: ffffa1a19374fcb8
RBP: ffffa1a1818e13c0 R08: 0000000100028b16 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffffa1a18ad7972c
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f9168312b80(0000) GS:ffffa1a4afcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f91683c9140 CR3: 000000010acaa000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? close_ctree+0x222/0x4d0 [btrfs]
? __warn.cold+0x8e/0xea
? close_ctree+0x222/0x4d0 [btrfs]
? report_bug+0xff/0x140
? handle_bug+0x3b/0x70
? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
? close_ctree+0x222/0x4d0 [btrfs]
generic_shutdown_super+0x70/0x160
kill_anon_super+0x11/0x40
btrfs_kill_super+0x11/0x20 [btrfs]
deactivate_locked_super+0x2e/0xa0
cleanup_mnt+0xb5/0x150
task_work_run+0x57/0x80
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x121/0x130
do_syscall_64+0xab/0x1a0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f916847a887
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
BTRFS error (device dm-8 state EA): qgroup reserved space leaked
Cases 2 and 3 in the out_reserve path both pertain to this type of leak
and must free the reserved qgroup data. Because it is already an error
path, I opted not to handle the possible errors in
btrfs_free_qgroup_data. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Fix incorrect size calculation for loop
[WHY]
fe_clk_en has size of 5 but sizeof(fe_clk_en) has byte size 20 which is
lager than the array size.
[HOW]
Divide byte size 20 by its element size.
This fixes 2 OVERRUN issues reported by Coverity. |
| Out of bounds write in ANGLE in Google Chrome prior to 139.0.7258.127 allowed a remote attacker to perform out of bounds memory access via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
soc: qcom: llcc: Handle a second device without data corruption
Usually there is only one llcc device. But if there were a second, even
a failed probe call would modify the global drv_data pointer. So check
if drv_data is valid before overwriting it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/tdx: Zero out the missing RSI in TDX_HYPERCALL macro
In the TDX_HYPERCALL asm, after the TDCALL instruction returns from the
untrusted VMM, the registers that the TDX guest shares to the VMM need
to be cleared to avoid speculative execution of VMM-provided values.
RSI is specified in the bitmap of those registers, but it is missing
when zeroing out those registers in the current TDX_HYPERCALL.
It was there when it was originally added in commit 752d13305c78
("x86/tdx: Expand __tdx_hypercall() to handle more arguments"), but was
later removed in commit 1e70c680375a ("x86/tdx: Do not corrupt
frame-pointer in __tdx_hypercall()"), which was correct because %rsi is
later restored in the "pop %rsi". However a later commit 7a3a401874be
("x86/tdx: Drop flags from __tdx_hypercall()") removed that "pop %rsi"
but forgot to add the "xor %rsi, %rsi" back.
Fix by adding it back. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/nouveau: keep DMA buffers required for suspend/resume
Nouveau deallocates a few buffers post GPU init which are required for GPU suspend/resume to function correctly.
This is likely not as big an issue on systems where the NVGPU is the only GPU, but on multi-GPU set ups it leads to a regression where the kernel module errors and results in a system-wide rendering freeze.
This commit addresses that regression by moving the two buffers required for suspend and resume to be deallocated at driver unload instead of post init. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: bridge: confirm multicast packets before passing them up the stack
conntrack nf_confirm logic cannot handle cloned skbs referencing
the same nf_conn entry, which will happen for multicast (broadcast)
frames on bridges.
Example:
macvlan0
|
br0
/ \
ethX ethY
ethX (or Y) receives a L2 multicast or broadcast packet containing
an IP packet, flow is not yet in conntrack table.
1. skb passes through bridge and fake-ip (br_netfilter)Prerouting.
-> skb->_nfct now references a unconfirmed entry
2. skb is broad/mcast packet. bridge now passes clones out on each bridge
interface.
3. skb gets passed up the stack.
4. In macvlan case, macvlan driver retains clone(s) of the mcast skb
and schedules a work queue to send them out on the lower devices.
The clone skb->_nfct is not a copy, it is the same entry as the
original skb. The macvlan rx handler then returns RX_HANDLER_PASS.
5. Normal conntrack hooks (in NF_INET_LOCAL_IN) confirm the orig skb.
The Macvlan broadcast worker and normal confirm path will race.
This race will not happen if step 2 already confirmed a clone. In that
case later steps perform skb_clone() with skb->_nfct already confirmed (in
hash table). This works fine.
But such confirmation won't happen when eb/ip/nftables rules dropped the
packets before they reached the nf_confirm step in postrouting.
Pablo points out that nf_conntrack_bridge doesn't allow use of stateful
nat, so we can safely discard the nf_conn entry and let inet call
conntrack again.
This doesn't work for bridge netfilter: skb could have a nat
transformation. Also bridge nf prevents re-invocation of inet prerouting
via 'sabotage_in' hook.
Work around this problem by explicit confirmation of the entry at LOCAL_IN
time, before upper layer has a chance to clone the unconfirmed entry.
The downside is that this disables NAT and conntrack helpers.
Alternative fix would be to add locking to all code parts that deal with
unconfirmed packets, but even if that could be done in a sane way this
opens up other problems, for example:
-m physdev --physdev-out eth0 -j SNAT --snat-to 1.2.3.4
-m physdev --physdev-out eth1 -j SNAT --snat-to 1.2.3.5
For multicast case, only one of such conflicting mappings will be
created, conntrack only handles 1:1 NAT mappings.
Users should set create a setup that explicitly marks such traffic
NOTRACK (conntrack bypass) to avoid this, but we cannot auto-bypass
them, ruleset might have accept rules for untracked traffic already,
so user-visible behaviour would change. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i2c: core: Run atomic i2c xfer when !preemptible
Since bae1d3a05a8b, i2c transfers are non-atomic if preemption is
disabled. However, non-atomic i2c transfers require preemption (e.g. in
wait_for_completion() while waiting for the DMA).
panic() calls preempt_disable_notrace() before calling
emergency_restart(). Therefore, if an i2c device is used for the
restart, the xfer should be atomic. This avoids warnings like:
[ 12.667612] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1 at kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h:318 rcu_note_context_switch+0x33c/0x6b0
[ 12.676926] Voluntary context switch within RCU read-side critical section!
...
[ 12.742376] schedule_timeout from wait_for_completion_timeout+0x90/0x114
[ 12.749179] wait_for_completion_timeout from tegra_i2c_wait_completion+0x40/0x70
...
[ 12.994527] atomic_notifier_call_chain from machine_restart+0x34/0x58
[ 13.001050] machine_restart from panic+0x2a8/0x32c
Use !preemptible() instead, which is basically the same check as
pre-v5.2. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drivers: perf: Check find_first_bit() return value
We must check the return value of find_first_bit() before using the
return value as an index array since it happens to overflow the array
and then panic:
[ 107.318430] Kernel BUG [#1]
[ 107.319434] CPU: 3 PID: 1238 Comm: kill Tainted: G E 6.6.0-rc6ubuntu-defconfig #2
[ 107.319465] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)
[ 107.319551] epc : pmu_sbi_ovf_handler+0x3a4/0x3ae
[ 107.319840] ra : pmu_sbi_ovf_handler+0x52/0x3ae
[ 107.319868] epc : ffffffff80a0a77c ra : ffffffff80a0a42a sp : ffffaf83fecda350
[ 107.319884] gp : ffffffff823961a8 tp : ffffaf8083db1dc0 t0 : ffffaf83fecda480
[ 107.319899] t1 : ffffffff80cafe62 t2 : 000000000000ff00 s0 : ffffaf83fecda520
[ 107.319921] s1 : ffffaf83fecda380 a0 : 00000018fca29df0 a1 : ffffffffffffffff
[ 107.319936] a2 : 0000000001073734 a3 : 0000000000000004 a4 : 0000000000000000
[ 107.319951] a5 : 0000000000000040 a6 : 000000001d1c8774 a7 : 0000000000504d55
[ 107.319965] s2 : ffffffff82451f10 s3 : ffffffff82724e70 s4 : 000000000000003f
[ 107.319980] s5 : 0000000000000011 s6 : ffffaf8083db27c0 s7 : 0000000000000000
[ 107.319995] s8 : 0000000000000001 s9 : 00007fffb45d6558 s10: 00007fffb45d81a0
[ 107.320009] s11: ffffaf7ffff60000 t3 : 0000000000000004 t4 : 0000000000000000
[ 107.320023] t5 : ffffaf7f80000000 t6 : ffffaf8000000000
[ 107.320037] status: 0000000200000100 badaddr: 0000000000000000 cause: 0000000000000003
[ 107.320081] [<ffffffff80a0a77c>] pmu_sbi_ovf_handler+0x3a4/0x3ae
[ 107.320112] [<ffffffff800b42d0>] handle_percpu_devid_irq+0x9e/0x1a0
[ 107.320131] [<ffffffff800ad92c>] generic_handle_domain_irq+0x28/0x36
[ 107.320148] [<ffffffff8065f9f8>] riscv_intc_irq+0x36/0x4e
[ 107.320166] [<ffffffff80caf4a0>] handle_riscv_irq+0x54/0x86
[ 107.320189] [<ffffffff80cb0036>] do_irq+0x64/0x96
[ 107.320271] Code: 85a6 855e b097 ff7f 80e7 9220 b709 9002 4501 bbd9 (9002) 6097
[ 107.320585] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[ 107.320704] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 107.320775] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 107.321219] Kernel Offset: 0x0 from 0xffffffff80000000
[ 107.333051] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt ]--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: pcrypt - Fix hungtask for PADATA_RESET
We found a hungtask bug in test_aead_vec_cfg as follows:
INFO: task cryptomgr_test:391009 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
Call trace:
__switch_to+0x98/0xe0
__schedule+0x6c4/0xf40
schedule+0xd8/0x1b4
schedule_timeout+0x474/0x560
wait_for_common+0x368/0x4e0
wait_for_completion+0x20/0x30
wait_for_completion+0x20/0x30
test_aead_vec_cfg+0xab4/0xd50
test_aead+0x144/0x1f0
alg_test_aead+0xd8/0x1e0
alg_test+0x634/0x890
cryptomgr_test+0x40/0x70
kthread+0x1e0/0x220
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
Kernel panic - not syncing: hung_task: blocked tasks
For padata_do_parallel, when the return err is 0 or -EBUSY, it will call
wait_for_completion(&wait->completion) in test_aead_vec_cfg. In normal
case, aead_request_complete() will be called in pcrypt_aead_serial and the
return err is 0 for padata_do_parallel. But, when pinst->flags is
PADATA_RESET, the return err is -EBUSY for padata_do_parallel, and it
won't call aead_request_complete(). Therefore, test_aead_vec_cfg will
hung at wait_for_completion(&wait->completion), which will cause
hungtask.
The problem comes as following:
(padata_do_parallel) |
rcu_read_lock_bh(); |
err = -EINVAL; | (padata_replace)
| pinst->flags |= PADATA_RESET;
err = -EBUSY |
if (pinst->flags & PADATA_RESET) |
rcu_read_unlock_bh() |
return err
In order to resolve the problem, we replace the return err -EBUSY with
-EAGAIN, which means parallel_data is changing, and the caller should call
it again.
v3:
remove retry and just change the return err.
v2:
introduce padata_try_do_parallel() in pcrypt_aead_encrypt and
pcrypt_aead_decrypt to solve the hungtask. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Detect IP == ksym.end as part of BPF program
Now that bpf_throw kfunc is the first such call instruction that has
noreturn semantics within the verifier, this also kicks in dead code
elimination in unprecedented ways. For one, any instruction following
a bpf_throw call will never be marked as seen. Moreover, if a callchain
ends up throwing, any instructions after the call instruction to the
eventually throwing subprog in callers will also never be marked as
seen.
The tempting way to fix this would be to emit extra 'int3' instructions
which bump the jited_len of a program, and ensure that during runtime
when a program throws, we can discover its boundaries even if the call
instruction to bpf_throw (or to subprogs that always throw) is emitted
as the final instruction in the program.
An example of such a program would be this:
do_something():
...
r0 = 0
exit
foo():
r1 = 0
call bpf_throw
r0 = 0
exit
bar(cond):
if r1 != 0 goto pc+2
call do_something
exit
call foo
r0 = 0 // Never seen by verifier
exit //
main(ctx):
r1 = ...
call bar
r0 = 0
exit
Here, if we do end up throwing, the stacktrace would be the following:
bpf_throw
foo
bar
main
In bar, the final instruction emitted will be the call to foo, as such,
the return address will be the subsequent instruction (which the JIT
emits as int3 on x86). This will end up lying outside the jited_len of
the program, thus, when unwinding, we will fail to discover the return
address as belonging to any program and end up in a panic due to the
unreliable stack unwinding of BPF programs that we never expect.
To remedy this case, make bpf_prog_ksym_find treat IP == ksym.end as
part of the BPF program, so that is_bpf_text_address returns true when
such a case occurs, and we are able to unwind reliably when the final
instruction ends up being a call instruction. |
