| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: vlan: don't propagate flags on open
With the device instance lock, there is now a possibility of a deadlock:
[ 1.211455] ============================================
[ 1.211571] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[ 1.211687] 6.14.0-rc5-01215-g032756b4ca7a-dirty #5 Not tainted
[ 1.211823] --------------------------------------------
[ 1.211936] ip/184 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 1.212032] ffff8881024a4c30 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: dev_set_allmulti+0x4e/0xb0
[ 1.212207]
[ 1.212207] but task is already holding lock:
[ 1.212332] ffff8881024a4c30 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: dev_open+0x50/0xb0
[ 1.212487]
[ 1.212487] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 1.212626] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 1.212626]
[ 1.212751] CPU0
[ 1.212815] ----
[ 1.212871] lock(&dev->lock);
[ 1.212944] lock(&dev->lock);
[ 1.213016]
[ 1.213016] *** DEADLOCK ***
[ 1.213016]
[ 1.213143] May be due to missing lock nesting notation
[ 1.213143]
[ 1.213294] 3 locks held by ip/184:
[ 1.213371] #0: ffffffff838b53e0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_nets_lock+0x1b/0xa0
[ 1.213543] #1: ffffffff84e5fc70 (&net->rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_nets_lock+0x37/0xa0
[ 1.213727] #2: ffff8881024a4c30 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: dev_open+0x50/0xb0
[ 1.213895]
[ 1.213895] stack backtrace:
[ 1.213991] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 184 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.14.0-rc5-01215-g032756b4ca7a-dirty #5
[ 1.213993] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014
[ 1.213994] Call Trace:
[ 1.213995] <TASK>
[ 1.213996] dump_stack_lvl+0x8e/0xd0
[ 1.214000] print_deadlock_bug+0x28b/0x2a0
[ 1.214020] lock_acquire+0xea/0x2a0
[ 1.214027] __mutex_lock+0xbf/0xd40
[ 1.214038] dev_set_allmulti+0x4e/0xb0 # real_dev->flags & IFF_ALLMULTI
[ 1.214040] vlan_dev_open+0xa5/0x170 # ndo_open on vlandev
[ 1.214042] __dev_open+0x145/0x270
[ 1.214046] __dev_change_flags+0xb0/0x1e0
[ 1.214051] netif_change_flags+0x22/0x60 # IFF_UP vlandev
[ 1.214053] dev_change_flags+0x61/0xb0 # for each device in group from dev->vlan_info
[ 1.214055] vlan_device_event+0x766/0x7c0 # on netdevsim0
[ 1.214058] notifier_call_chain+0x78/0x120
[ 1.214062] netif_open+0x6d/0x90
[ 1.214064] dev_open+0x5b/0xb0 # locks netdevsim0
[ 1.214066] bond_enslave+0x64c/0x1230
[ 1.214075] do_set_master+0x175/0x1e0 # on netdevsim0
[ 1.214077] do_setlink+0x516/0x13b0
[ 1.214094] rtnl_newlink+0xaba/0xb80
[ 1.214132] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x440/0x490
[ 1.214144] netlink_rcv_skb+0xeb/0x120
[ 1.214150] netlink_unicast+0x1f9/0x320
[ 1.214153] netlink_sendmsg+0x346/0x3f0
[ 1.214157] __sock_sendmsg+0x86/0xb0
[ 1.214160] ____sys_sendmsg+0x1c8/0x220
[ 1.214164] ___sys_sendmsg+0x28f/0x2d0
[ 1.214179] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0xef/0x140
[ 1.214184] do_syscall_64+0xec/0x1d0
[ 1.214190] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 1.214191] RIP: 0033:0x7f2d1b4a7e56
Device setup:
netdevsim0 (down)
^ ^
bond netdevsim1.100@netdevsim1 allmulticast=on (down)
When we enslave the lower device (netdevsim0) which has a vlan, we
propagate vlan's allmuti/promisc flags during ndo_open. This causes
(re)locking on of the real_dev.
Propagate allmulti/promisc on flags change, not on the open. There
is a slight semantics change that vlans that are down now propagate
the flags, but this seems unlikely to result in the real issues.
Reproducer:
echo 0 1 > /sys/bus/netdevsim/new_device
dev_path=$(ls -d /sys/bus/netdevsim/devices/netdevsim0/net/*)
dev=$(echo $dev_path | rev | cut -d/ -f1 | rev)
ip link set dev $dev name netdevsim0
ip link set dev netdevsim0 up
ip link add link netdevsim0 name netdevsim0.100 type vlan id 100
ip link set dev netdevsim0.100 allm
---truncated--- |
| A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Simple Machines Forum v2.1.6 allows attackers to execute arbitrary web scripts or HTML via injecting a crafted payload into the Forum Name parameter. |
| MEGACO dissector infinite loop in Wireshark 4.6.0 to 4.6.1 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.11 allows denial of service |
| Tornado is a Python web framework and asynchronous networking library. Versions 6.5.2 and below use an inefficient algorithm when parsing parameters for HTTP header values, potentially causing a DoS. The _parseparam function in httputil.py is used to parse specific HTTP header values, such as those in multipart/form-data and repeatedly calls string.count() within a nested loop while processing quoted semicolons. If an attacker sends a request with a large number of maliciously crafted parameters in a Content-Disposition header, the server's CPU usage increases quadratically (O(n²)) during parsing. Due to Tornado's single event loop architecture, a single malicious request can cause the entire server to become unresponsive for an extended period. This issue is fixed in version 6.5.3. |
| A flaw was found in python. An improperly handled HTTP response in the HTTP client code of python may allow a remote attacker, who controls the HTTP server, to make the client script enter an infinite loop, consuming CPU time. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to system availability. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net_sched: hfsc: Address reentrant enqueue adding class to eltree twice
Savino says:
"We are writing to report that this recent patch
(141d34391abbb315d68556b7c67ad97885407547) [1]
can be bypassed, and a UAF can still occur when HFSC is utilized with
NETEM.
The patch only checks the cl->cl_nactive field to determine whether
it is the first insertion or not [2], but this field is only
incremented by init_vf [3].
By using HFSC_RSC (which uses init_ed) [4], it is possible to bypass the
check and insert the class twice in the eltree.
Under normal conditions, this would lead to an infinite loop in
hfsc_dequeue for the reasons we already explained in this report [5].
However, if TBF is added as root qdisc and it is configured with a
very low rate,
it can be utilized to prevent packets from being dequeued.
This behavior can be exploited to perform subsequent insertions in the
HFSC eltree and cause a UAF."
To fix both the UAF and the infinite loop, with netem as an hfsc child,
check explicitly in hfsc_enqueue whether the class is already in the eltree
whenever the HFSC_RSC flag is set.
[1] https://web.git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=141d34391abbb315d68556b7c67ad97885407547
[2] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.15-rc5/source/net/sched/sch_hfsc.c#L1572
[3] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.15-rc5/source/net/sched/sch_hfsc.c#L677
[4] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.15-rc5/source/net/sched/sch_hfsc.c#L1574
[5] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/8DuRWwfqjoRDLDmBMlIfbrsZg9Gx50DHJc1ilxsEBNe2D6NMoigR_eIRIG0LOjMc3r10nUUZtArXx4oZBIdUfZQrwjcQhdinnMis_0G7VEk=@willsroot.io/T/#u |
| The recv_and_process_client_pkt function in networking/ntpd.c in busybox allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU and bandwidth consumption) via a forged NTP packet, which triggers a communication loop. |
| MONGO dissector infinite loop in Wireshark 4.4.0 to 4.4.9 and 4.2.0 to 4.2.13 allows denial of service |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
exfat: add cluster chain loop check for dir
An infinite loop may occur if the following conditions occur due to
file system corruption.
(1) Condition for exfat_count_dir_entries() to loop infinitely.
- The cluster chain includes a loop.
- There is no UNUSED entry in the cluster chain.
(2) Condition for exfat_create_upcase_table() to loop infinitely.
- The cluster chain of the root directory includes a loop.
- There are no UNUSED entry and up-case table entry in the cluster
chain of the root directory.
(3) Condition for exfat_load_bitmap() to loop infinitely.
- The cluster chain of the root directory includes a loop.
- There are no UNUSED entry and bitmap entry in the cluster chain
of the root directory.
(4) Condition for exfat_find_dir_entry() to loop infinitely.
- The cluster chain includes a loop.
- The unused directory entries were exhausted by some operation.
(5) Condition for exfat_check_dir_empty() to loop infinitely.
- The cluster chain includes a loop.
- The unused directory entries were exhausted by some operation.
- All files and sub-directories under the directory are deleted.
This commit adds checks to break the above infinite loop. |
| A denial of service vulnerability due to a deadlock was found in sctp_auto_asconf_init in net/sctp/socket.c in the Linux kernel’s SCTP subsystem. This flaw allows guests with local user privileges to trigger a deadlock and potentially crash the system. |
| An issue has been discovered in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions starting from 16.2 before 16.3.6, all versions starting from 16.4 before 16.4.2, all versions starting from 16.5 before 16.5.1. A low-privileged attacker can point a CI/CD Component to an incorrect path and cause the server to exhaust all available memory through an infinite loop and cause Denial of Service. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: phy: Don't register LEDs for genphy
If a PHY has no driver, the genphy driver is probed/removed directly in
phy_attach/detach. If the PHY's ofnode has an "leds" subnode, then the
LEDs will be (un)registered when probing/removing the genphy driver.
This could occur if the leds are for a non-generic driver that isn't
loaded for whatever reason. Synchronously removing the PHY device in
phy_detach leads to the following deadlock:
rtnl_lock()
ndo_close()
...
phy_detach()
phy_remove()
phy_leds_unregister()
led_classdev_unregister()
led_trigger_set()
netdev_trigger_deactivate()
unregister_netdevice_notifier()
rtnl_lock()
There is a corresponding deadlock on the open/register side of things
(and that one is reported by lockdep), but it requires a race while this
one is deterministic.
Generic PHYs do not support LEDs anyway, so don't bother registering
them. |
| Memory corruptions can be remotely triggered in the Control-M/Agent when SSL/TLS communication is configured.
The issue occurs in the following cases:
* Control-M/Agent 9.0.20: SSL/TLS configuration is set to the non-default setting "use_openssl=n";
* Control-M/Agent 9.0.21 and 9.0.22: Agent router configuration uses the non-default settings "JAVA_AR=N" and "use_openssl=n" |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
page_pool: avoid infinite loop to schedule delayed worker
We noticed the kworker in page_pool_release_retry() was waken
up repeatedly and infinitely in production because of the
buggy driver causing the inflight less than 0 and warning
us in page_pool_inflight()[1].
Since the inflight value goes negative, it means we should
not expect the whole page_pool to get back to work normally.
This patch mitigates the adverse effect by not rescheduling
the kworker when detecting the inflight negative in
page_pool_release_retry().
[1]
[Mon Feb 10 20:36:11 2025] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[Mon Feb 10 20:36:11 2025] Negative(-51446) inflight packet-pages
...
[Mon Feb 10 20:36:11 2025] Call Trace:
[Mon Feb 10 20:36:11 2025] page_pool_release_retry+0x23/0x70
[Mon Feb 10 20:36:11 2025] process_one_work+0x1b1/0x370
[Mon Feb 10 20:36:11 2025] worker_thread+0x37/0x3a0
[Mon Feb 10 20:36:11 2025] kthread+0x11a/0x140
[Mon Feb 10 20:36:11 2025] ? process_one_work+0x370/0x370
[Mon Feb 10 20:36:11 2025] ? __kthread_cancel_work+0x40/0x40
[Mon Feb 10 20:36:11 2025] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
[Mon Feb 10 20:36:11 2025] ---[ end trace ebffe800f33e7e34 ]---
Note: before this patch, the above calltrace would flood the
dmesg due to repeated reschedule of release_dw kworker. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm crypt: add cond_resched() to dmcrypt_write()
The loop in dmcrypt_write may be running for unbounded amount of time,
thus we need cond_resched() in it.
This commit fixes the following warning:
[ 3391.153255][ C12] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#12 stuck for 23s! [dmcrypt_write/2:2897]
...
[ 3391.387210][ C12] Call trace:
[ 3391.390338][ C12] blk_attempt_bio_merge.part.6+0x38/0x158
[ 3391.395970][ C12] blk_attempt_plug_merge+0xc0/0x1b0
[ 3391.401085][ C12] blk_mq_submit_bio+0x398/0x550
[ 3391.405856][ C12] submit_bio_noacct+0x308/0x380
[ 3391.410630][ C12] dmcrypt_write+0x1e4/0x208 [dm_crypt]
[ 3391.416005][ C12] kthread+0x130/0x138
[ 3391.419911][ C12] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, sockmap: Fix an infinite loop error when len is 0 in tcp_bpf_recvmsg_parser()
When the buffer length of the recvmsg system call is 0, we got the
flollowing soft lockup problem:
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#3 stuck for 27s! [a.out:6149]
CPU: 3 PID: 6149 Comm: a.out Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.2.0+ #30
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:remove_wait_queue+0xb/0xc0
Code: 5e 41 5f c3 cc cc cc cc 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 57 <41> 56 41 55 41 54 55 48 89 fd 53 48 89 f3 4c 8d 6b 18 4c 8d 73 20
RSP: 0018:ffff88811b5978b8 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88811a7d3780 RCX: ffffffffb7a4d768
RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: ffff88811b597908 RDI: ffff888115408040
RBP: 1ffff110236b2f1b R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88811a7d37e7
R10: ffffed10234fa6fc R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88811179b800
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff88811a7d38a8 R15: ffff88811a7d37e0
FS: 00007f6fb5398740(0000) GS:ffff888237180000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020000000 CR3: 000000010b6ba002 CR4: 0000000000370ee0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
tcp_msg_wait_data+0x279/0x2f0
tcp_bpf_recvmsg_parser+0x3c6/0x490
inet_recvmsg+0x280/0x290
sock_recvmsg+0xfc/0x120
____sys_recvmsg+0x160/0x3d0
___sys_recvmsg+0xf0/0x180
__sys_recvmsg+0xea/0x1a0
do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
The logic in tcp_bpf_recvmsg_parser is as follows:
msg_bytes_ready:
copied = sk_msg_recvmsg(sk, psock, msg, len, flags);
if (!copied) {
wait data;
goto msg_bytes_ready;
}
In this case, "copied" always is 0, the infinite loop occurs.
According to the Linux system call man page, 0 should be returned in this
case. Therefore, in tcp_bpf_recvmsg_parser(), if the length is 0, directly
return. Also modify several other functions with the same problem. |
| There is a defect in the CPython “tarfile” module affecting the “TarFile” extraction and entry enumeration APIs. The tar implementation would process tar archives with negative offsets without error, resulting in an infinite loop and deadlock during the parsing of maliciously crafted tar archives.
This vulnerability can be mitigated by including the following patch after importing the “tarfile” module: https://gist.github.com/sethmlarson/1716ac5b82b73dbcbf23ad2eff8b33e1 |
| In some circumstances, when DNSdist is configured to use the nghttp2 library to process incoming DNS over HTTPS queries, an attacker might be able to cause a denial of service by crafting a DoH exchange that triggers an unbounded I/O read loop, causing an unexpected consumption of CPU resources. |
| EDK2's Network Package is susceptible to an infinite lop vulnerability when parsing a PadN option in the Destination Options header of IPv6. This
vulnerability can be exploited by an attacker to gain unauthorized
access and potentially lead to a loss of Availability. |
| EDK2's Network Package is susceptible to an infinite loop vulnerability when parsing unknown options in the Destination Options header of IPv6. This
vulnerability can be exploited by an attacker to gain unauthorized
access and potentially lead to a loss of Availability. |
