| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
procfs: avoid fetching build ID while holding VMA lock
Fix PROCMAP_QUERY to fetch optional build ID only after dropping mmap_lock
or per-VMA lock, whichever was used to lock VMA under question, to avoid
deadlock reported by syzbot:
-> #1 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}:
__might_fault+0xed/0x170
_copy_to_iter+0x118/0x1720
copy_page_to_iter+0x12d/0x1e0
filemap_read+0x720/0x10a0
blkdev_read_iter+0x2b5/0x4e0
vfs_read+0x7f4/0xae0
ksys_read+0x12a/0x250
do_syscall_64+0xcb/0xf80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
-> #0 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#8){++++}-{4:4}:
__lock_acquire+0x1509/0x26d0
lock_acquire+0x185/0x340
down_read+0x98/0x490
blkdev_read_iter+0x2a7/0x4e0
__kernel_read+0x39a/0xa90
freader_fetch+0x1d5/0xa80
__build_id_parse.isra.0+0xea/0x6a0
do_procmap_query+0xd75/0x1050
procfs_procmap_ioctl+0x7a/0xb0
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x18e/0x210
do_syscall_64+0xcb/0xf80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
rlock(&mm->mmap_lock);
lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#8);
lock(&mm->mmap_lock);
rlock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#8);
*** DEADLOCK ***
This seems to be exacerbated (as we haven't seen these syzbot reports
before that) by the recent:
777a8560fd29 ("lib/buildid: use __kernel_read() for sleepable context")
To make this safe, we need to grab file refcount while VMA is still locked, but
other than that everything is pretty straightforward. Internal build_id_parse()
API assumes VMA is passed, but it only needs the underlying file reference, so
just add another variant build_id_parse_file() that expects file passed
directly.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix up kerneldoc] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: amd: fix memory leak in acp3x pdm dma ops |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm, shmem: prevent infinite loop on truncate race
When truncating a large swap entry, shmem_free_swap() returns 0 when the
entry's index doesn't match the given index due to lookup alignment. The
failure fallback path checks if the entry crosses the end border and
aborts when it happens, so truncate won't erase an unexpected entry or
range. But one scenario was ignored.
When `index` points to the middle of a large swap entry, and the large
swap entry doesn't go across the end border, find_get_entries() will
return that large swap entry as the first item in the batch with
`indices[0]` equal to `index`. The entry's base index will be smaller
than `indices[0]`, so shmem_free_swap() will fail and return 0 due to the
"base < index" check. The code will then call shmem_confirm_swap(), get
the order, check if it crosses the END boundary (which it doesn't), and
retry with the same index.
The next iteration will find the same entry again at the same index with
same indices, leading to an infinite loop.
Fix this by retrying with a round-down index, and abort if the index is
smaller than the truncate range. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: i2c-hid: fix potential buffer overflow in i2c_hid_get_report()
`i2c_hid_xfer` is used to read `recv_len + sizeof(__le16)` bytes of data
into `ihid->rawbuf`.
The former can come from the userspace in the hidraw driver and is only
bounded by HID_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE(16384) by default (unless we also set
`max_buffer_size` field of `struct hid_ll_driver` which we do not).
The latter has size determined at runtime by the maximum size of
different report types you could receive on any particular device and
can be a much smaller value.
Fix this by truncating `recv_len` to `ihid->bufsize - sizeof(__le16)`.
The impact is low since access to hidraw devices requires root. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dpaa2-switch: prevent ZERO_SIZE_PTR dereference when num_ifs is zero
The driver allocates arrays for ports, FDBs, and filter blocks using
kcalloc() with ethsw->sw_attr.num_ifs as the element count. When the
device reports zero interfaces (either due to hardware configuration
or firmware issues), kcalloc(0, ...) returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR (0x10)
instead of NULL.
Later in dpaa2_switch_probe(), the NAPI initialization unconditionally
accesses ethsw->ports[0]->netdev, which attempts to dereference
ZERO_SIZE_PTR (address 0x10), resulting in a kernel panic.
Add a check to ensure num_ifs is greater than zero after retrieving
device attributes. This prevents the zero-sized allocations and
subsequent invalid pointer dereference. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: sync read disk super and set block size
When the user performs a btrfs mount, the block device is not set
correctly. The user sets the block size of the block device to 0x4000
by executing the BLKBSZSET command.
Since the block size change also changes the mapping->flags value, this
further affects the result of the mapping_min_folio_order() calculation.
Let's analyze the following two scenarios:
Scenario 1: Without executing the BLKBSZSET command, the block size is
0x1000, and mapping_min_folio_order() returns 0;
Scenario 2: After executing the BLKBSZSET command, the block size is
0x4000, and mapping_min_folio_order() returns 2.
do_read_cache_folio() allocates a folio before the BLKBSZSET command
is executed. This results in the allocated folio having an order value
of 0. Later, after BLKBSZSET is executed, the block size increases to
0x4000, and the mapping_min_folio_order() calculation result becomes 2.
This leads to two undesirable consequences:
1. filemap_add_folio() triggers a VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO(folio_order(folio) <
mapping_min_folio_order(mapping)) assertion.
2. The syzbot report [1] shows a null pointer dereference in
create_empty_buffers() due to a buffer head allocation failure.
Synchronization should be established based on the inode between the
BLKBSZSET command and read cache page to prevent inconsistencies in
block size or mapping flags before and after folio allocation.
[1]
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
RIP: 0010:create_empty_buffers+0x4d/0x480 fs/buffer.c:1694
Call Trace:
folio_create_buffers+0x109/0x150 fs/buffer.c:1802
block_read_full_folio+0x14c/0x850 fs/buffer.c:2403
filemap_read_folio+0xc8/0x2a0 mm/filemap.c:2496
do_read_cache_folio+0x266/0x5c0 mm/filemap.c:4096
do_read_cache_page mm/filemap.c:4162 [inline]
read_cache_page_gfp+0x29/0x120 mm/filemap.c:4195
btrfs_read_disk_super+0x192/0x500 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1367 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: aloop: Fix racy access at PCM trigger
The PCM trigger callback of aloop driver tries to check the PCM state
and stop the stream of the tied substream in the corresponding cable.
Since both check and stop operations are performed outside the cable
lock, this may result in UAF when a program attempts to trigger
frequently while opening/closing the tied stream, as spotted by
fuzzers.
For addressing the UAF, this patch changes two things:
- It covers the most of code in loopback_check_format() with
cable->lock spinlock, and add the proper NULL checks. This avoids
already some racy accesses.
- In addition, now we try to check the state of the capture PCM stream
that may be stopped in this function, which was the major pain point
leading to UAF. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb/server: fix refcount leak in smb2_open()
When ksmbd_vfs_getattr() fails, the reference count of ksmbd_file
must be released. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cgroup/dmem: avoid pool UAF
An UAF issue was observed:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in page_counter_uncharge+0x65/0x150
Write of size 8 at addr ffff888106715440 by task insmod/527
CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 527 Comm: insmod 6.19.0-rc7-next-20260129+ #11
Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x82/0xd0
kasan_report+0xca/0x100
kasan_check_range+0x39/0x1c0
page_counter_uncharge+0x65/0x150
dmem_cgroup_uncharge+0x1f/0x260
Allocated by task 527:
Freed by task 0:
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888106715400
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
The buggy address is located 64 bytes inside of
freed 512-byte region [ffff888106715400, ffff888106715600)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888106715300: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff888106715380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff888106715400: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff888106715480: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff888106715500: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
The issue occurs because a pool can still be held by a caller after its
associated memory region is unregistered. The current implementation frees
the pool even if users still hold references to it (e.g., before uncharge
operations complete).
This patch adds a reference counter to each pool, ensuring that a pool is
only freed when its reference count drops to zero. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: target: iscsi: Fix use-after-free in iscsit_dec_session_usage_count()
In iscsit_dec_session_usage_count(), the function calls complete() while
holding the sess->session_usage_lock. Similar to the connection usage count
logic, the waiter signaled by complete() (e.g., in the session release
path) may wake up and free the iscsit_session structure immediately.
This creates a race condition where the current thread may attempt to
execute spin_unlock_bh() on a session structure that has already been
deallocated, resulting in a KASAN slab-use-after-free.
To resolve this, release the session_usage_lock before calling complete()
to ensure all dereferences of the sess pointer are finished before the
waiter is allowed to proceed with deallocation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: toshiba_haps: Fix memory leaks in add/remove routines
toshiba_haps_add() leaks the haps object allocated by it if it returns
an error after allocating that object successfully.
toshiba_haps_remove() does not free the object pointed to by
toshiba_haps before clearing that pointer, so it becomes unreachable
allocated memory.
Address these memory leaks by using devm_kzalloc() for allocating
the memory in question. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv: Sanitize syscall table indexing under speculation
The syscall number is a user-controlled value used to index into the
syscall table. Use array_index_nospec() to clamp this value after the
bounds check to prevent speculative out-of-bounds access and subsequent
data leakage via cache side channels. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: fix NULL pointer dereference in ceph_mds_auth_match()
The CephFS kernel client has regression starting from 6.18-rc1.
We have issue in ceph_mds_auth_match() if fs_name == NULL:
const char fs_name = mdsc->fsc->mount_options->mds_namespace;
...
if (auth->match.fs_name && strcmp(auth->match.fs_name, fs_name)) {
/ fsname mismatch, try next one */
return 0;
}
Patrick Donnelly suggested that: In summary, we should definitely start
decoding `fs_name` from the MDSMap and do strict authorizations checks
against it. Note that the `-o mds_namespace=foo` should only be used for
selecting the file system to mount and nothing else. It's possible
no mds_namespace is specified but the kernel will mount the only
file system that exists which may have name "foo".
This patch reworks ceph_mdsmap_decode() and namespace_equals() with
the goal of supporting the suggested concept. Now struct ceph_mdsmap
contains m_fs_name field that receives copy of extracted FS name
by ceph_extract_encoded_string(). For the case of "old" CephFS file
systems, it is used "cephfs" name.
[ idryomov: replace redundant %*pE with %s in ceph_mdsmap_decode(),
get rid of a series of strlen() calls in ceph_namespace_match(),
drop changes to namespace_equals() body to avoid treating empty
mds_namespace as equal, drop changes to ceph_mdsc_handle_fsmap()
as namespace_equals() isn't an equivalent substitution there ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: mmp_pdma: Fix race condition in mmp_pdma_residue()
Add proper locking in mmp_pdma_residue() to prevent use-after-free when
accessing descriptor list and descriptor contents.
The race occurs when multiple threads call tx_status() while the tasklet
on another CPU is freeing completed descriptors:
CPU 0 CPU 1
----- -----
mmp_pdma_tx_status()
mmp_pdma_residue()
-> NO LOCK held
list_for_each_entry(sw, ..)
DMA interrupt
dma_do_tasklet()
-> spin_lock(&desc_lock)
list_move(sw->node, ...)
spin_unlock(&desc_lock)
| dma_pool_free(sw) <- FREED!
-> access sw->desc <- UAF!
This issue can be reproduced when running dmatest on the same channel with
multiple threads (threads_per_chan > 1).
Fix by protecting the chain_running list iteration and descriptor access
with the chan->desc_lock spinlock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i2c: imx: preserve error state in block data length handler
When a block read returns an invalid length, zero or >I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX,
the length handler sets the state to IMX_I2C_STATE_FAILED. However,
i2c_imx_master_isr() unconditionally overwrites this with
IMX_I2C_STATE_READ_CONTINUE, causing an endless read loop that overruns
buffers and crashes the system.
Guard the state transition to preserve error states set by the length
handler. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet-tcp: fixup hang in nvmet_tcp_listen_data_ready()
When the socket is closed while in TCP_LISTEN a callback is run to
flush all outstanding packets, which in turns calls
nvmet_tcp_listen_data_ready() with the sk_callback_lock held.
So we need to check if we are in TCP_LISTEN before attempting
to get the sk_callback_lock() to avoid a deadlock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rust_binder: correctly handle FDA objects of length zero
Fix a bug where an empty FDA (fd array) object with 0 fds would cause an
out-of-bounds error. The previous implementation used `skip == 0` to
mean "this is a pointer fixup", but 0 is also the correct skip length
for an empty FDA. If the FDA is at the end of the buffer, then this
results in an attempt to write 8-bytes out of bounds. This is caught and
results in an EINVAL error being returned to userspace.
The pattern of using `skip == 0` as a special value originates from the
C-implementation of Binder. As part of fixing this bug, this pattern is
replaced with a Rust enum.
I considered the alternate option of not pushing a fixup when the length
is zero, but I think it's cleaner to just get rid of the zero-is-special
stuff.
The root cause of this bug was diagnosed by Gemini CLI on first try. I
used the following prompt:
> There appears to be a bug in @drivers/android/binder/thread.rs where
> the Fixups oob bug is triggered with 316 304 316 324. This implies
> that we somehow ended up with a fixup where buffer A has a pointer to
> buffer B, but the pointer is located at an index in buffer A that is
> out of bounds. Please investigate the code to find the bug. You may
> compare with @drivers/android/binder.c that implements this correctly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: fix oops due to invalid pointer for kfree() in parse_longname()
This fixes a kernel oops when reading ceph snapshot directories (.snap),
for example by simply running `ls /mnt/my_ceph/.snap`.
The variable str is guarded by __free(kfree), but advanced by one for
skipping the initial '_' in snapshot names. Thus, kfree() is called
with an invalid pointer. This patch removes the need for advancing the
pointer so kfree() is called with correct memory pointer.
Steps to reproduce:
1. Create snapshots on a cephfs volume (I've 63 snaps in my testcase)
2. Add cephfs mount to fstab
$ echo "samba-fileserver@.files=/volumes/datapool/stuff/3461082b-ecc9-4e82-8549-3fd2590d3fb6 /mnt/test/stuff ceph acl,noatime,_netdev 0 0" >> /etc/fstab
3. Reboot the system
$ systemctl reboot
4. Check if it's really mounted
$ mount | grep stuff
5. List snapshots (expected 63 snapshots on my system)
$ ls /mnt/test/stuff/.snap
Now ls hangs forever and the kernel log shows the oops. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb/server: call ksmbd_session_rpc_close() on error path in create_smb2_pipe()
When ksmbd_iov_pin_rsp() fails, we should call ksmbd_session_rpc_close(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
linkwatch: use __dev_put() in callers to prevent UAF
After linkwatch_do_dev() calls __dev_put() to release the linkwatch
reference, the device refcount may drop to 1. At this point,
netdev_run_todo() can proceed (since linkwatch_sync_dev() sees an
empty list and returns without blocking), wait for the refcount to
become 1 via netdev_wait_allrefs_any(), and then free the device
via kobject_put().
This creates a use-after-free when __linkwatch_run_queue() tries to
call netdev_unlock_ops() on the already-freed device.
Note that adding netdev_lock_ops()/netdev_unlock_ops() pair in
netdev_run_todo() before kobject_put() would not work, because
netdev_lock_ops() is conditional - it only locks when
netdev_need_ops_lock() returns true. If the device doesn't require
ops_lock, linkwatch won't hold any lock, and netdev_run_todo()
acquiring the lock won't provide synchronization.
Fix this by moving __dev_put() from linkwatch_do_dev() to its
callers. The device reference logically pairs with de-listing the
device, so it's reasonable for the caller that did the de-listing
to release it. This allows placing __dev_put() after all device
accesses are complete, preventing UAF.
The bug can be reproduced by adding mdelay(2000) after
linkwatch_do_dev() in __linkwatch_run_queue(), then running:
ip tuntap add mode tun name tun_test
ip link set tun_test up
ip link set tun_test carrier off
ip link set tun_test carrier on
sleep 0.5
ip tuntap del mode tun name tun_test
KASAN report:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in netdev_need_ops_lock include/net/netdev_lock.h:33 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in netdev_unlock_ops include/net/netdev_lock.h:47 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __linkwatch_run_queue+0x865/0x8a0 net/core/link_watch.c:245
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88804de5c008 by task kworker/u32:10/8123
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 8123 Comm: kworker/u32:10 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events_unbound linkwatch_event
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x100/0x190 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0x156/0x4c9 mm/kasan/report.c:482
kasan_report+0xdf/0x1a0 mm/kasan/report.c:595
netdev_need_ops_lock include/net/netdev_lock.h:33 [inline]
netdev_unlock_ops include/net/netdev_lock.h:47 [inline]
__linkwatch_run_queue+0x865/0x8a0 net/core/link_watch.c:245
linkwatch_event+0x8f/0xc0 net/core/link_watch.c:304
process_one_work+0x9c2/0x1840 kernel/workqueue.c:3257
process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3340 [inline]
worker_thread+0x5da/0xe40 kernel/workqueue.c:3421
kthread+0x3b3/0x730 kernel/kthread.c:463
ret_from_fork+0x754/0xaf0 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:246
</TASK>
================================================================== |
