| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: explicitly clear the sk pointer, when pf->create fails
We have recently noticed the exact same KASAN splat as in commit
6cd4a78d962b ("net: do not leave a dangling sk pointer, when socket
creation fails"). The problem is that commit did not fully address the
problem, as some pf->create implementations do not use sk_common_release
in their error paths.
For example, we can use the same reproducer as in the above commit, but
changing ping to arping. arping uses AF_PACKET socket and if packet_create
fails, it will just sk_free the allocated sk object.
While we could chase all the pf->create implementations and make sure they
NULL the freed sk object on error from the socket, we can't guarantee
future protocols will not make the same mistake.
So it is easier to just explicitly NULL the sk pointer upon return from
pf->create in __sock_create. We do know that pf->create always releases the
allocated sk object on error, so if the pointer is not NULL, it is
definitely dangling. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
secretmem: disable memfd_secret() if arch cannot set direct map
Return -ENOSYS from memfd_secret() syscall if !can_set_direct_map(). This
is the case for example on some arm64 configurations, where marking 4k
PTEs in the direct map not present can only be done if the direct map is
set up at 4k granularity in the first place (as ARM's break-before-make
semantics do not easily allow breaking apart large/gigantic pages).
More precisely, on arm64 systems with !can_set_direct_map(),
set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() is a no-op, however it returns success
(0) instead of an error. This means that memfd_secret will seemingly
"work" (e.g. syscall succeeds, you can mmap the fd and fault in pages),
but it does not actually achieve its goal of removing its memory from the
direct map.
Note that with this patch, memfd_secret() will start erroring on systems
where can_set_direct_map() returns false (arm64 with
CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED=n, CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC=n and
CONFIG_KFENCE=n), but that still seems better than the current silent
failure. Since CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED defaults to 'y', most
arm64 systems actually have a working memfd_secret() and aren't be
affected.
From going through the iterations of the original memfd_secret patch
series, it seems that disabling the syscall in these scenarios was the
intended behavior [1] (preferred over having
set_direct_map_invalid_noflush return an error as that would result in
SIGBUSes at page-fault time), however the check for it got dropped between
v16 [2] and v17 [3], when secretmem moved away from CMA allocations.
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201124164930.GK8537@kernel.org/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210121122723.3446-11-rppt@kernel.org/#t
[3]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201125092208.12544-10-rppt@kernel.org/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock: Update rx_bytes on read_skb()
Make sure virtio_transport_inc_rx_pkt() and virtio_transport_dec_rx_pkt()
calls are balanced (i.e. virtio_vsock_sock::rx_bytes doesn't lie) after
vsock_transport::read_skb().
While here, also inform the peer that we've freed up space and it has more
credit.
Failing to update rx_bytes after packet is dequeued leads to a warning on
SOCK_STREAM recv():
[ 233.396654] rx_queue is empty, but rx_bytes is non-zero
[ 233.396702] WARNING: CPU: 11 PID: 40601 at net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c:589 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Make sure internal and UAPI bpf_redirect flags don't overlap
The bpf_redirect_info is shared between the SKB and XDP redirect paths,
and the two paths use the same numeric flag values in the ri->flags
field (specifically, BPF_F_BROADCAST == BPF_F_NEXTHOP). This means that
if skb bpf_redirect_neigh() is used with a non-NULL params argument and,
subsequently, an XDP redirect is performed using the same
bpf_redirect_info struct, the XDP path will get confused and end up
crashing, which syzbot managed to trigger.
With the stack-allocated bpf_redirect_info, the structure is no longer
shared between the SKB and XDP paths, so the crash doesn't happen
anymore. However, different code paths using identically-numbered flag
values in the same struct field still seems like a bit of a mess, so
this patch cleans that up by moving the flag definitions together and
redefining the three flags in BPF_F_REDIRECT_INTERNAL to not overlap
with the flags used for XDP. It also adds a BUILD_BUG_ON() check to make
sure the overlap is not re-introduced by mistake. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: devmap: provide rxq after redirect
rxq contains a pointer to the device from where
the redirect happened. Currently, the BPF program
that was executed after a redirect via BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP*
does not have it set.
This is particularly bad since accessing ingress_ifindex, e.g.
SEC("xdp")
int prog(struct xdp_md *pkt)
{
return bpf_redirect_map(&dev_redirect_map, 0, 0);
}
SEC("xdp/devmap")
int prog_after_redirect(struct xdp_md *pkt)
{
bpf_printk("ifindex %i", pkt->ingress_ifindex);
return XDP_PASS;
}
depends on access to rxq, so a NULL pointer gets dereferenced:
<1>[ 574.475170] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
<1>[ 574.475188] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
<1>[ 574.475194] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
<6>[ 574.475199] PGD 0 P4D 0
<4>[ 574.475207] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
<4>[ 574.475217] CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 217 Comm: kworker/4:1 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc5-reduced-00859-g780801200300 #23
<4>[ 574.475226] Hardware name: Intel(R) Client Systems NUC13ANHi7/NUC13ANBi7, BIOS ANRPL357.0026.2023.0314.1458 03/14/2023
<4>[ 574.475231] Workqueue: mld mld_ifc_work
<4>[ 574.475247] RIP: 0010:bpf_prog_5e13354d9cf5018a_prog_after_redirect+0x17/0x3c
<4>[ 574.475257] Code: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc 80 00 00 00 cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc f3 0f 1e fa 0f 1f 44 00 00 66 90 55 48 89 e5 f3 0f 1e fa 48 8b 57 20 <48> 8b 52 00 8b 92 e0 00 00 00 48 bf f8 a6 d5 c4 5d a0 ff ff be 0b
<4>[ 574.475263] RSP: 0018:ffffa62440280c98 EFLAGS: 00010206
<4>[ 574.475269] RAX: ffffa62440280cd8 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000
<4>[ 574.475274] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffa62440549048 RDI: ffffa62440280ce0
<4>[ 574.475278] RBP: ffffa62440280c98 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000001
<4>[ 574.475281] R10: ffffa05dc8b98000 R11: ffffa05f577fca40 R12: ffffa05dcab24000
<4>[ 574.475285] R13: ffffa62440280ce0 R14: ffffa62440549048 R15: ffffa62440549000
<4>[ 574.475289] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa05f4f700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
<4>[ 574.475294] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
<4>[ 574.475298] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000025522e000 CR4: 0000000000f50ef0
<4>[ 574.475303] PKRU: 55555554
<4>[ 574.475306] Call Trace:
<4>[ 574.475313] <IRQ>
<4>[ 574.475318] ? __die+0x23/0x70
<4>[ 574.475329] ? page_fault_oops+0x180/0x4c0
<4>[ 574.475339] ? skb_pp_cow_data+0x34c/0x490
<4>[ 574.475346] ? kmem_cache_free+0x257/0x280
<4>[ 574.475357] ? exc_page_fault+0x67/0x150
<4>[ 574.475368] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
<4>[ 574.475381] ? bpf_prog_5e13354d9cf5018a_prog_after_redirect+0x17/0x3c
<4>[ 574.475386] bq_xmit_all+0x158/0x420
<4>[ 574.475397] __dev_flush+0x30/0x90
<4>[ 574.475407] veth_poll+0x216/0x250 [veth]
<4>[ 574.475421] __napi_poll+0x28/0x1c0
<4>[ 574.475430] net_rx_action+0x32d/0x3a0
<4>[ 574.475441] handle_softirqs+0xcb/0x2c0
<4>[ 574.475451] do_softirq+0x40/0x60
<4>[ 574.475458] </IRQ>
<4>[ 574.475461] <TASK>
<4>[ 574.475464] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x66/0x70
<4>[ 574.475471] __dev_queue_xmit+0x268/0xe40
<4>[ 574.475480] ? selinux_ip_postroute+0x213/0x420
<4>[ 574.475491] ? alloc_skb_with_frags+0x4a/0x1d0
<4>[ 574.475502] ip6_finish_output2+0x2be/0x640
<4>[ 574.475512] ? nf_hook_slow+0x42/0xf0
<4>[ 574.475521] ip6_finish_output+0x194/0x300
<4>[ 574.475529] ? __pfx_ip6_finish_output+0x10/0x10
<4>[ 574.475538] mld_sendpack+0x17c/0x240
<4>[ 574.475548] mld_ifc_work+0x192/0x410
<4>[ 574.475557] process_one_work+0x15d/0x380
<4>[ 574.475566] worker_thread+0x29d/0x3a0
<4>[ 574.475573] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
<4>[ 574.475580] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
<4>[ 574.475587] kthread+0xcd/0x100
<4>[ 574.475597] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
<4>[ 574.475606] ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50
<4>[ 574.475615] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
<4>[ 574.475623] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: target: core: Fix null-ptr-deref in target_alloc_device()
There is a null-ptr-deref issue reported by KASAN:
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in target_alloc_device+0xbc4/0xbe0 [target_core_mod]
...
kasan_report+0xb9/0xf0
target_alloc_device+0xbc4/0xbe0 [target_core_mod]
core_dev_setup_virtual_lun0+0xef/0x1f0 [target_core_mod]
target_core_init_configfs+0x205/0x420 [target_core_mod]
do_one_initcall+0xdd/0x4e0
...
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
In target_alloc_device(), if allocing memory for dev queues fails, then
dev will be freed by dev->transport->free_device(), but dev->transport
is not initialized at that time, which will lead to a null pointer
reference problem.
Fixing this bug by freeing dev with hba->backend->ops->free_device(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix OOBs when building SMB2_IOCTL request
When using encryption, either enforced by the server or when using
'seal' mount option, the client will squash all compound request buffers
down for encryption into a single iov in smb2_set_next_command().
SMB2_ioctl_init() allocates a small buffer (448 bytes) to hold the
SMB2_IOCTL request in the first iov, and if the user passes an input
buffer that is greater than 328 bytes, smb2_set_next_command() will
end up writing off the end of @rqst->iov[0].iov_base as shown below:
mount.cifs //srv/share /mnt -o ...,seal
ln -s $(perl -e "print('a')for 1..1024") /mnt/link
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in
smb2_set_next_command.cold+0x1d6/0x24c [cifs]
Write of size 4116 at addr ffff8881148fcab8 by task ln/859
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 859 Comm: ln Not tainted 6.12.0-rc3 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS
1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80
? smb2_set_next_command.cold+0x1d6/0x24c [cifs]
print_report+0x156/0x4d9
? smb2_set_next_command.cold+0x1d6/0x24c [cifs]
? __virt_addr_valid+0x145/0x310
? __phys_addr+0x46/0x90
? smb2_set_next_command.cold+0x1d6/0x24c [cifs]
kasan_report+0xda/0x110
? smb2_set_next_command.cold+0x1d6/0x24c [cifs]
kasan_check_range+0x10f/0x1f0
__asan_memcpy+0x3c/0x60
smb2_set_next_command.cold+0x1d6/0x24c [cifs]
smb2_compound_op+0x238c/0x3840 [cifs]
? kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
? kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x70
? vfs_symlink+0x1a1/0x2c0
? do_symlinkat+0x108/0x1c0
? __pfx_smb2_compound_op+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
? kmem_cache_free+0x118/0x3e0
? cifs_get_writable_path+0xeb/0x1a0 [cifs]
smb2_get_reparse_inode+0x423/0x540 [cifs]
? __pfx_smb2_get_reparse_inode+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
? rcu_is_watching+0x20/0x50
? __kmalloc_noprof+0x37c/0x480
? smb2_create_reparse_symlink+0x257/0x490 [cifs]
? smb2_create_reparse_symlink+0x38f/0x490 [cifs]
smb2_create_reparse_symlink+0x38f/0x490 [cifs]
? __pfx_smb2_create_reparse_symlink+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
? find_held_lock+0x8a/0xa0
? hlock_class+0x32/0xb0
? __build_path_from_dentry_optional_prefix+0x19d/0x2e0 [cifs]
cifs_symlink+0x24f/0x960 [cifs]
? __pfx_make_vfsuid+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_cifs_symlink+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
? make_vfsgid+0x6b/0xc0
? generic_permission+0x96/0x2d0
vfs_symlink+0x1a1/0x2c0
do_symlinkat+0x108/0x1c0
? __pfx_do_symlinkat+0x10/0x10
? strncpy_from_user+0xaa/0x160
__x64_sys_symlinkat+0xb9/0xf0
do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x1d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f08d75c13bb |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: bnep: fix wild-memory-access in proto_unregister
There's issue as follows:
KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0xdead...108-0xdead...10f]
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 2805 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G W
RIP: 0010:proto_unregister+0xee/0x400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__do_sys_delete_module+0x318/0x580
do_syscall_64+0xc1/0x1d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
As bnep_init() ignore bnep_sock_init()'s return value, and bnep_sock_init()
will cleanup all resource. Then when remove bnep module will call
bnep_sock_cleanup() to cleanup sock's resource.
To solve above issue just return bnep_sock_init()'s return value in
bnep_exit(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: validate new SA's prefixlen using SA family when sel.family is unset
This expands the validation introduced in commit 07bf7908950a ("xfrm:
Validate address prefix lengths in the xfrm selector.")
syzbot created an SA with
usersa.sel.family = AF_UNSPEC
usersa.sel.prefixlen_s = 128
usersa.family = AF_INET
Because of the AF_UNSPEC selector, verify_newsa_info doesn't put
limits on prefixlen_{s,d}. But then copy_from_user_state sets
x->sel.family to usersa.family (AF_INET). Do the same conversion in
verify_newsa_info before validating prefixlen_{s,d}, since that's how
prefixlen is going to be used later on. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ACPI: PRM: Find EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME block for PRM handler and context
PRMT needs to find the correct type of block to translate the PA-VA
mapping for EFI runtime services.
The issue arises because the PRMT is finding a block of type
EFI_CONVENTIONAL_MEMORY, which is not appropriate for runtime services
as described in Section 2.2.2 (Runtime Services) of the UEFI
Specification [1]. Since the PRM handler is a type of runtime service,
this causes an exception when the PRM handler is called.
[Firmware Bug]: Unable to handle paging request in EFI runtime service
WARNING: CPU: 22 PID: 4330 at drivers/firmware/efi/runtime-wrappers.c:341
__efi_queue_work+0x11c/0x170
Call trace:
Let PRMT find a block with EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME for PRM handler and PRM
context.
If no suitable block is found, a warning message will be printed, but
the procedure continues to manage the next PRM handler.
However, if the PRM handler is actually called without proper allocation,
it would result in a failure during error handling.
By using the correct memory types for runtime services, ensure that the
PRM handler and the context are properly mapped in the virtual address
space during runtime, preventing the paging request error.
The issue is really that only memory that has been remapped for runtime
by the firmware can be used by the PRM handler, and so the region needs
to have the EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME attribute.
[ rjw: Subject and changelog edits ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: wwan: fix global oob in wwan_rtnl_policy
The variable wwan_rtnl_link_ops assign a *bigger* maxtype which leads to
a global out-of-bounds read when parsing the netlink attributes. Exactly
same bug cause as the oob fixed in commit b33fb5b801c6 ("net: qualcomm:
rmnet: fix global oob in rmnet_policy").
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in validate_nla lib/nlattr.c:388 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in __nla_validate_parse+0x19d7/0x29a0 lib/nlattr.c:603
Read of size 1 at addr ffffffff8b09cb60 by task syz.1.66276/323862
CPU: 0 PID: 323862 Comm: syz.1.66276 Not tainted 6.1.70 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x177/0x231 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:284 [inline]
print_report+0x14f/0x750 mm/kasan/report.c:395
kasan_report+0x139/0x170 mm/kasan/report.c:495
validate_nla lib/nlattr.c:388 [inline]
__nla_validate_parse+0x19d7/0x29a0 lib/nlattr.c:603
__nla_parse+0x3c/0x50 lib/nlattr.c:700
nla_parse_nested_deprecated include/net/netlink.h:1269 [inline]
__rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3514 [inline]
rtnl_newlink+0x7bc/0x1fd0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3623
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x794/0xef0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6122
netlink_rcv_skb+0x1de/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2508
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1326 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x74b/0x8c0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1352
netlink_sendmsg+0x882/0xb90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1874
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:716 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:728 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x5cc/0x8f0 net/socket.c:2499
___sys_sendmsg+0x21c/0x290 net/socket.c:2553
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2591 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg+0x19e/0x270 net/socket.c:2589
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x45/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7f67b19a24ad
RSP: 002b:00007f67b17febb8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f67b1b45f80 RCX: 00007f67b19a24ad
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020005e40 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00007f67b1a1e01d R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007ffd2513764f R14: 00007ffd251376e0 R15: 00007f67b17fed40
</TASK>
The buggy address belongs to the variable:
wwan_rtnl_policy+0x20/0x40
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:ffffea00002c2700 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0xb09c
flags: 0xfff00000001000(reserved|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
raw: 00fff00000001000 ffffea00002c2708 ffffea00002c2708 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner info is not present (never set?)
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffffffff8b09ca00: 05 f9 f9 f9 05 f9 f9 f9 00 01 f9 f9 00 01 f9 f9
ffffffff8b09ca80: 00 00 00 05 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 03 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9
>ffffffff8b09cb00: 00 00 00 00 05 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9
^
ffffffff8b09cb80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
==================================================================
According to the comment of `nla_parse_nested_deprecated`, use correct size
`IFLA_WWAN_MAX` here to fix this issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd: Guard against bad data for ATIF ACPI method
If a BIOS provides bad data in response to an ATIF method call
this causes a NULL pointer dereference in the caller.
```
? show_regs (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:478 (discriminator 1))
? __die (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:423 arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:434)
? page_fault_oops (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:544 (discriminator 2) arch/x86/mm/fault.c:705 (discriminator 2))
? do_user_addr_fault (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:440 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1232 (discriminator 1))
? acpi_ut_update_object_reference (drivers/acpi/acpica/utdelete.c:642)
? exc_page_fault (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1542)
? asm_exc_page_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:623)
? amdgpu_atif_query_backlight_caps.constprop.0 (drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_acpi.c:387 (discriminator 2)) amdgpu
? amdgpu_atif_query_backlight_caps.constprop.0 (drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_acpi.c:386 (discriminator 1)) amdgpu
```
It has been encountered on at least one system, so guard for it.
(cherry picked from commit c9b7c809b89f24e9372a4e7f02d64c950b07fdee) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: nSVM: Ignore nCR3[4:0] when loading PDPTEs from memory
Ignore nCR3[4:0] when loading PDPTEs from memory for nested SVM, as bits
4:0 of CR3 are ignored when PAE paging is used, and thus VMRUN doesn't
enforce 32-byte alignment of nCR3.
In the absolute worst case scenario, failure to ignore bits 4:0 can result
in an out-of-bounds read, e.g. if the target page is at the end of a
memslot, and the VMM isn't using guard pages.
Per the APM:
The CR3 register points to the base address of the page-directory-pointer
table. The page-directory-pointer table is aligned on a 32-byte boundary,
with the low 5 address bits 4:0 assumed to be 0.
And the SDM's much more explicit:
4:0 Ignored
Note, KVM gets this right when loading PDPTRs, it's only the nSVM flow
that is broken. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: fix one more kernel-infoleak in algo dumping
During fuzz testing, the following issue was discovered:
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_iter+0x598/0x2a30
_copy_to_iter+0x598/0x2a30
__skb_datagram_iter+0x168/0x1060
skb_copy_datagram_iter+0x5b/0x220
netlink_recvmsg+0x362/0x1700
sock_recvmsg+0x2dc/0x390
__sys_recvfrom+0x381/0x6d0
__x64_sys_recvfrom+0x130/0x200
x64_sys_call+0x32c8/0x3cc0
do_syscall_64+0xd8/0x1c0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x79/0x81
Uninit was stored to memory at:
copy_to_user_state_extra+0xcc1/0x1e00
dump_one_state+0x28c/0x5f0
xfrm_state_walk+0x548/0x11e0
xfrm_dump_sa+0x1e0/0x840
netlink_dump+0x943/0x1c40
__netlink_dump_start+0x746/0xdb0
xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x429/0xc00
netlink_rcv_skb+0x613/0x780
xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x77/0xc0
netlink_unicast+0xe90/0x1280
netlink_sendmsg+0x126d/0x1490
__sock_sendmsg+0x332/0x3d0
____sys_sendmsg+0x863/0xc30
___sys_sendmsg+0x285/0x3e0
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x2d6/0x560
x64_sys_call+0x1316/0x3cc0
do_syscall_64+0xd8/0x1c0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x79/0x81
Uninit was created at:
__kmalloc+0x571/0xd30
attach_auth+0x106/0x3e0
xfrm_add_sa+0x2aa0/0x4230
xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x832/0xc00
netlink_rcv_skb+0x613/0x780
xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x77/0xc0
netlink_unicast+0xe90/0x1280
netlink_sendmsg+0x126d/0x1490
__sock_sendmsg+0x332/0x3d0
____sys_sendmsg+0x863/0xc30
___sys_sendmsg+0x285/0x3e0
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x2d6/0x560
x64_sys_call+0x1316/0x3cc0
do_syscall_64+0xd8/0x1c0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x79/0x81
Bytes 328-379 of 732 are uninitialized
Memory access of size 732 starts at ffff88800e18e000
Data copied to user address 00007ff30f48aff0
CPU: 2 PID: 18167 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.8.11 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
Fixes copying of xfrm algorithms where some random
data of the structure fields can end up in userspace.
Padding in structures may be filled with random (possibly sensitve)
data and should never be given directly to user-space.
A similar issue was resolved in the commit
8222d5910dae ("xfrm: Zero padding when dumping algos and encap")
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md/raid10: fix null ptr dereference in raid10_size()
In raid10_run() if raid10_set_queue_limits() succeed, the return value
is set to zero, and if following procedures failed raid10_run() will
return zero while mddev->private is still NULL, causing null ptr
dereference in raid10_size().
Fix the problem by only overwrite the return value if
raid10_set_queue_limits() failed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86/intel/pmc: Fix pmc_core_iounmap to call iounmap for valid addresses
Commit 50c6dbdfd16e ("x86/ioremap: Improve iounmap() address range checks")
introduces a WARN when adrress ranges of iounmap are invalid. On Thinkpad
P1 Gen 7 (Meteor Lake-P) this caused the following warning to appear:
WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 713 at arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c:461 iounmap+0x58/0x1f0
Modules linked in: rfkill(+) snd_timer(+) fjes(+) snd soundcore intel_pmc_core(+)
int3403_thermal(+) int340x_thermal_zone intel_vsec pmt_telemetry acpi_pad pmt_class
acpi_tad int3400_thermal acpi_thermal_rel joydev loop nfnetlink zram xe drm_suballoc_helper
nouveau i915 mxm_wmi drm_ttm_helper gpu_sched drm_gpuvm drm_exec drm_buddy i2c_algo_bit
crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ttm crc32c_intel polyval_clmulni rtsx_pci_sdmmc ucsi_acpi
polyval_generic mmc_core hid_multitouch drm_display_helper ghash_clmulni_intel typec_ucsi
nvme sha512_ssse3 video sha256_ssse3 nvme_core intel_vpu sha1_ssse3 rtsx_pci cec typec
nvme_auth i2c_hid_acpi i2c_hid wmi pinctrl_meteorlake serio_raw ip6_tables ip_tables fuse
CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 713 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 6.12.0-rc2iounmap+ #42
Hardware name: LENOVO 21KWCTO1WW/21KWCTO1WW, BIOS N48ET19W (1.06 ) 07/18/2024
RIP: 0010:iounmap+0x58/0x1f0
Code: 85 6a 01 00 00 48 8b 05 e6 e2 28 04 48 39 c5 72 19 eb 26 cc cc cc 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00 00 32 00 48 8d 44 02 ff 48 39 c5 72 23 <0f> 0b 48 83 c4 08 5b 5d 41 5c c3 cc cc cc cc 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffff888131eff038 EFLAGS: 00010207
RAX: ffffc90000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff888e33b80000
RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: ffff888e33bc29c0 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff8881598a8000 R09: ffff888e2ccedc10
R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffffffffb3367634 R12: 00000000fe000000
R13: ffff888101d0da28 R14: ffffffffc2e437e0 R15: ffff888110b03b28
FS: 00007f3c1d4b3980(0000) GS:ffff888e33b80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00005651cfc93578 CR3: 0000000124e4c002 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __warn.cold+0xb6/0x176
? iounmap+0x58/0x1f0
? report_bug+0x1f4/0x2b0
? handle_bug+0x58/0x90
? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x40
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
? iounmap+0x58/0x1f0
pmc_core_ssram_get_pmc+0x477/0x6c0 [intel_pmc_core]
? __pfx_pmc_core_ssram_get_pmc+0x10/0x10 [intel_pmc_core]
? __pfx_do_pci_enable_device+0x10/0x10
? pci_wait_for_pending+0x60/0x110
? pci_enable_device_flags+0x1e3/0x2e0
? __pfx_mtl_core_init+0x10/0x10 [intel_pmc_core]
pmc_core_ssram_init+0x7f/0x110 [intel_pmc_core]
mtl_core_init+0xda/0x130 [intel_pmc_core]
? __mutex_init+0xb9/0x130
pmc_core_probe+0x27e/0x10b0 [intel_pmc_core]
? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x96/0xf0
? __pfx_pmc_core_probe+0x10/0x10 [intel_pmc_core]
? __pfx_mutex_unlock+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
? device_pm_check_callbacks+0x82/0x370
? acpi_dev_pm_attach+0x234/0x2b0
platform_probe+0x9f/0x150
really_probe+0x1e0/0x8a0
__driver_probe_device+0x18c/0x370
? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10
driver_probe_device+0x4a/0x120
__driver_attach+0x190/0x4a0
? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10
bus_for_each_dev+0x103/0x180
? __pfx_bus_for_each_dev+0x10/0x10
? klist_add_tail+0x136/0x270
bus_add_driver+0x2fc/0x540
driver_register+0x1a5/0x360
? __pfx_pmc_core_driver_init+0x10/0x10 [intel_pmc_core]
do_one_initcall+0xa4/0x380
? __pfx_do_one_initcall+0x10/0x10
? kasan_unpoison+0x44/0x70
do_init_module+0x296/0x800
load_module+0x5090/0x6ce0
? __pfx_load_module+0x10/0x10
? ima_post_read_file+0x193/0x200
? __pfx_ima_post_read_file+0x10/0x10
? rw_verify_area+0x152/0x4c0
? kernel_read_file+0x257/0x750
? __pfx_kernel_read_file+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_filemap_get_read_batch+0x10/0x10
? init_module_from_file+0xd1/0x130
init_module_from_file+0xd1/0x130
? __pfx_init_module_from_file+0x10/0
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86: fix user address masking non-canonical speculation issue
It turns out that AMD has a "Meltdown Lite(tm)" issue with non-canonical
accesses in kernel space. And so using just the high bit to decide
whether an access is in user space or kernel space ends up with the good
old "leak speculative data" if you have the right gadget using the
result:
CVE-2020-12965 “Transient Execution of Non-Canonical Accesses“
Now, the kernel surrounds the access with a STAC/CLAC pair, and those
instructions end up serializing execution on older Zen architectures,
which closes the speculation window.
But that was true only up until Zen 5, which renames the AC bit [1].
That improves performance of STAC/CLAC a lot, but also means that the
speculation window is now open.
Note that this affects not just the new address masking, but also the
regular valid_user_address() check used by access_ok(), and the asm
version of the sign bit check in the get_user() helpers.
It does not affect put_user() or clear_user() variants, since there's no
speculative result to be used in a gadget for those operations. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/vt-d: Fix incorrect pci_for_each_dma_alias() for non-PCI devices
Previously, the domain_context_clear() function incorrectly called
pci_for_each_dma_alias() to set up context entries for non-PCI devices.
This could lead to kernel hangs or other unexpected behavior.
Add a check to only call pci_for_each_dma_alias() for PCI devices. For
non-PCI devices, domain_context_clear_one() is called directly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: probes: Remove broken LDR (literal) uprobe support
The simulate_ldr_literal() and simulate_ldrsw_literal() functions are
unsafe to use for uprobes. Both functions were originally written for
use with kprobes, and access memory with plain C accesses. When uprobes
was added, these were reused unmodified even though they cannot safely
access user memory.
There are three key problems:
1) The plain C accesses do not have corresponding extable entries, and
thus if they encounter a fault the kernel will treat these as
unintentional accesses to user memory, resulting in a BUG() which
will kill the kernel thread, and likely lead to further issues (e.g.
lockup or panic()).
2) The plain C accesses are subject to HW PAN and SW PAN, and so when
either is in use, any attempt to simulate an access to user memory
will fault. Thus neither simulate_ldr_literal() nor
simulate_ldrsw_literal() can do anything useful when simulating a
user instruction on any system with HW PAN or SW PAN.
3) The plain C accesses are privileged, as they run in kernel context,
and in practice can access a small range of kernel virtual addresses.
The instructions they simulate have a range of +/-1MiB, and since the
simulated instructions must itself be a user instructions in the
TTBR0 address range, these can address the final 1MiB of the TTBR1
acddress range by wrapping downwards from an address in the first
1MiB of the TTBR0 address range.
In contemporary kernels the last 8MiB of TTBR1 address range is
reserved, and accesses to this will always fault, meaning this is no
worse than (1).
Historically, it was theoretically possible for the linear map or
vmemmap to spill into the final 8MiB of the TTBR1 address range, but
in practice this is extremely unlikely to occur as this would
require either:
* Having enough physical memory to fill the entire linear map all the
way to the final 1MiB of the TTBR1 address range.
* Getting unlucky with KASLR randomization of the linear map such
that the populated region happens to overlap with the last 1MiB of
the TTBR address range.
... and in either case if we were to spill into the final page there
would be larger problems as the final page would alias with error
pointers.
Practically speaking, (1) and (2) are the big issues. Given there have
been no reports of problems since the broken code was introduced, it
appears that no-one is relying on probing these instructions with
uprobes.
Avoid these issues by not allowing uprobes on LDR (literal) and LDRSW
(literal), limiting the use of simulate_ldr_literal() and
simulate_ldrsw_literal() to kprobes. Attempts to place uprobes on LDR
(literal) and LDRSW (literal) will be rejected as
arm_probe_decode_insn() will return INSN_REJECTED. In future we can
consider introducing working uprobes support for these instructions, but
this will require more significant work. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
thermal: intel: int340x: processor: Fix warning during module unload
The processor_thermal driver uses pcim_device_enable() to enable a PCI
device, which means the device will be automatically disabled on driver
detach. Thus there is no need to call pci_disable_device() again on it.
With recent PCI device resource management improvements, e.g. commit
f748a07a0b64 ("PCI: Remove legacy pcim_release()"), this problem is
exposed and triggers the warining below.
[ 224.010735] proc_thermal_pci 0000:00:04.0: disabling already-disabled device
[ 224.010747] WARNING: CPU: 8 PID: 4442 at drivers/pci/pci.c:2250 pci_disable_device+0xe5/0x100
...
[ 224.010844] Call Trace:
[ 224.010845] <TASK>
[ 224.010847] ? show_regs+0x6d/0x80
[ 224.010851] ? __warn+0x8c/0x140
[ 224.010854] ? pci_disable_device+0xe5/0x100
[ 224.010856] ? report_bug+0x1c9/0x1e0
[ 224.010859] ? handle_bug+0x46/0x80
[ 224.010862] ? exc_invalid_op+0x1d/0x80
[ 224.010863] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1f/0x30
[ 224.010867] ? pci_disable_device+0xe5/0x100
[ 224.010869] ? pci_disable_device+0xe5/0x100
[ 224.010871] ? kfree+0x21a/0x2b0
[ 224.010873] pcim_disable_device+0x20/0x30
[ 224.010875] devm_action_release+0x16/0x20
[ 224.010878] release_nodes+0x47/0xc0
[ 224.010880] devres_release_all+0x9f/0xe0
[ 224.010883] device_unbind_cleanup+0x12/0x80
[ 224.010885] device_release_driver_internal+0x1ca/0x210
[ 224.010887] driver_detach+0x4e/0xa0
[ 224.010889] bus_remove_driver+0x6f/0xf0
[ 224.010890] driver_unregister+0x35/0x60
[ 224.010892] pci_unregister_driver+0x44/0x90
[ 224.010894] proc_thermal_pci_driver_exit+0x14/0x5f0 [processor_thermal_device_pci]
...
[ 224.010921] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Remove the excess pci_disable_device() calls.
[ rjw: Subject and changelog edits ] |
